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‘Documentary’	and	the	phonograph		The	power	of	audio	technology	to	capture	and	reproduce	past	events	has	given	rise	to	a	pervasive	reading	of	such	technology:	one	in	which	the	phonograph	is	understood	as	a	type	of	‘document’.	In	many	respects,	the	power	of	the	phonograph	(the	device)	to	record	the	past	is	the	most	immediate	and	easily	understood	usage,	as	Edison	himself	identified	upon	hearing	the	first	reproductions	of	his	invention	in	1877.	Writing	in	the	North	American	Review	the	following	year,	Edison	confessed	he	was	‘in	a	somewhat	chaotic	condition	of	mind’	regarding	the	possibilities	of	his	invention	(Edison,	1878/2012,	p.	29),	though	it	appears	that	the	majority	of	his	proposed	uses	for	his	phonograph	were	underscored	by	this	key	observation.	In	the	same	publication,	Edison	detailed	some	of	the	applications	he	felt	his	phonograph	could	excel	at:		 1) Dictation	2) Books	(readings	of	books	already	written	for	the	blind	and	for	those	“whose	hands	may	be	otherwise	employed”)	
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far	from	the	kind	of	‘fidelity’	modern	digital	technology	offers.	The	enormous	advances	of	recording	technology	during	his	career,	along	with	his	own	engagement	with	it	as	composer	and	conductor,	makes	Stravinsky’s	perspective	on	classical	music	recordings	an	important	one.	Not	only	is	Stravinsky’s	perspective	important	given	his	close	relationship	with	the	evolution	of	recording	technology,	but	also	his	perspective	is	representative	of	the	wider	culture	of	classical	music.1	It	should	be	noted	that	Stravinsky	was	not	only	interested	in	recording	technology	for	its	ability	to	capture	live	performance.	In	1930,	he	wrote	of	his	desire	for	other	composers	to	create	phonograph-specific	music,	revealing	an	appreciation	of	the	potential	of	recording	technology	beyond	the	established	phonograph-as-document	paradigm.2	Here	Stravinsky	has	likely	identified	the	second	essential	feature	of	the	phonograph	I	have	described	previously:	its	ontological	distinction	from	that	which	is	recorded.	His	call	for	phonograph-specific	music	suggests	that	this	distinction	is	something	to	be	exploited.	However,	where	classical	music	recordings	are	concerned,	Stravinsky	mutes	the	creative	potential	of	the	phonograph,	instead	promoting	the	phonograph	as	a	tool	for	documentary	alone,	with	a	dictation-like	function	similar	to	that	which	Edison	envisaged	in	1877.		In	Stravinsky’s	1936	autobiography,	he	recounts	the	early	recordings	of	his	compositions	made	for	Columbia.	Of	these	recordings,	which	he	conducted,	Stravinsky	writes:		 These	 records,	 very	 successful	 from	 a	 technical	 point	 of	 view,	 have	 the	importance	of	documents	which	can	serve	as	guides	to	all	the	executants	of	my	 music.	 Unfortunately,	 very	 few	 conductors	 avail	 themselves	 of	 them.	Some	 do	 not	 even	 enquire	 whether	 such	 records	 exist.	 Doubtless	 their	dignity	prevents	others	 from	consulting	 them,	especially	since	 if	once	 they	knew	the	record	they	could	not	with	a	clear	conscious	conduct	as	they	liked.	(Stravinsky	1936/2012,	p.	107)		






nominalist	view.	Central	to	this	conception	of	the	work	is	that	it	is	both	universal	and	singular.	Of	the	Platonist	view,	she	writes:		 In	 one	of	 its	 articulations,	musical	works	 are	 argued,	 contrary	 to	 common	sense,	 to	 be	 universals	 –	 perhaps	 even	 natural	 kinds	 –	 constituted	 by	structures	 of	 sounds.	 They	 lack	 spatio-temporal	 properties	 and	 exist	everlastingly.	 They	 exist	 long	 before	 any	 compositional	 activity	 has	 taken	place	and	long	after	they	perhaps	have	been	forgotten.	They	exist	even	if	no	performances	 or	 score-copies	 have	 been	produced.	 To	 compose	 a	work	 is	less	to	create	a	kind,	than	it	is	to	discover	one.	(1992,	p.	14)		In	Goehr’s	discussion,	Jerrold	Levinson’s	modification	of	this	view	holds	the	work	dependent	upon	‘human	intentional	act	for	them	to	come	into	existence,	and	performances	and	scores	for	them	to	stay	in	existence’	(1992,	p.	15).	The	work	itself	however,	remains	distinct	from	such	dependents,	aligning	Levinson’s	definition	with	the	Platonist	view	in	positioning	the	work	as	abstract.	The	
Aristotelian	view	posits	that	the	existence	of	a	work	is	dependent	upon	its	performance	and	indistinct	from	such	a	performance.	Like	the	Platonist	view,	the	work	exists	in	the	abstract,	but	only	during	and	as	a	result	of	performance.	In	this	
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sense,	an	Aristotelian	view	holds	that	a	distinct	work	exists	as	‘unactualized	or	unsubstantiated	potential’	(p.	16).	The	Idealist	view,	perhaps	the	most	widely	held	yet	unexamined	reading	of	the	work,	holds	that:			 Works	 are…ideas	 formed	 in	 the	 mind	 of	 composers.	 These	 ideas,	 once	formed,	 find	 objectified	 expression	 through	 score	 copies	 and	 are,	 thereby,	made	publicly	accessible.	(1992,	p.	18)		On	this	view,	works	only	exist	in	the	mind	of	the	composer;	therefore	score-copies	are	not	creations,	but	limited	actualisations.	In	this	way,	a	score	only	grants	limited	access	to	the	work.	I	argue	that	Stravinsky	holds	a	nominalist	view	of	the	work,	possibly	Idealist	in	nature,	as	he	believes	his	scores	are	inadequate	guides	for	other	executants.	In	Stravinsky’s	view,	a	composer-conducted	performance	allows	greater	access	to	the	work,	and	presumably,	a	composer-sanctioned	recording	of	this	performance	does	also.	Regardless	of	Stravinsky’s	exact	position	in	the	nominalist	spectrum,	he	positions	the	work	in	relation	to	himself:		he	alone	has	privileged	access	to	it.	The	inadequacies	presented	by	his	score,	by	the	performance,	and	by	the	recording	itself,	can	be	attended	to	and	refined	by	Stravinsky	in	order	to	achieve	the	closest	possible	rendering	of	his	work	in	relation	to	the	work.	Stravinsky’s	disparaging	comments	regarding	the	tendency	of	conductors	to	assume	a	level	of	authorship	of	works	they	conduct,	certainly	attests	to	this	perspective.	Where	the	composer	is	not	the	executant	of	the	performance,	it	follows	that	such	a	performance	acts	as	both	an	actualisation	and	a	distortion	of	the	work,	as	a	conductor	only	has	access	to	the	score,	itself	a	limited	actualisation	of	the	work.	A	recording	of	such	a	performance	might	then	be	understood	as	a	further	distortion	and	actualisation	of	the	work,	though,	in	the	case	of	Stravinsky,	it	is	unclear	whether	he	considered	a	recording	to	have	any	relationship	to	the	work	beyond	that	of	a	guide.	Regardless	of	the	specificity	of	this	relationship,	for	Stravinsky,	we	might	conclude	that	a	non-composer	conducted	and	sanctioned	recording	of	the	work	is	three-times	removed	from	the	work	itself,	as	both	the	score	and	the	performance	stand	between	the	two.	This	would	hold	true	for	all	three	nominalist	positions.		
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does	this	by	muting	the	sonic	signatures	(‘noise’,	distortion’)	of	the	technology	employed,	while	promoting	a	sense	of	realism	(spatial,	timbral	and	dynamic	fidelity	to	the	source),	the	second	kind	of	transparency.	The	focus	on	realism	in	recording,	like	the	muting	of	the	technology’s	sonic	signatures,	is	designed	to	bring	the	listener	as	close	to	the	work	as	possible.	Many	classical	music	recording	techniques	are	designed	to	make	a	listener	feel	as	if	they	are	in	the	room	with	the	ensemble.	Techniques	including	Alan	Blumlein’s	stereophonic	microphone	arrays	developed	in	the	1930s,	and	binaural	‘dummy	head’	microphone	systems,	were	developed	with	this	goal	in	mind.	More	recently,	ambisonic	recording	techniques	have	gained	popularity	in	both	classical	music	and	film	music	recording,	perhaps	as	a	result	of	the	proliferation	of	surround	sound	in	home	theatre	systems.	In	this	way,	we	can	still	observe	the	desire	for	transparent	documents	within	the	genre.	There	are	some	instances	in	which	the	notion	of	transparency	and	purity	in	classical	music	recordings	are	challenged.	This	was	most	pronounced	with	the	advent	of	magnetic	tape,	a	format	which	introduced	the	technique	of	splicing;	an	editing	technique	in	which	the	phonograph	moves	from	one	recorded	performance	to	another,	usually	maintaining	the	illusion	that	the	two	(or	more)	performances	are	in	fact	one	continuous	take.	As	Brian	Eno	notes:		 The	move	 to	 tape	was	 very	 important,	 because	 as	 soon	 as	 something’s	 on	tape,	 it	 becomes	a	 substance	which	 is	malleable	 and	mutable	 and	 cuttable	and	reversible	in	ways	that	disks	aren’t.	(Eno	2004,	p.	128)		Where	the	nominalist	work	is	concerned,	we	might	conclude	that	editing	takes	a	recording	yet	another,	fourth,	step	away	from	the	work	itself,	which	is	where	the	opposition	to	editing	finds	its	roots.	The	question	must	be	asked:	does	editing	a	performance	distort	the	performance,	thereby	further	distancing	a	recording	from	the	work?	Or	does	editing,	in	instances	where	the	edits	are	undetected	by	the	listener,	actually	bring	the	recording	closer	to	the	work?	For	Glenn	Gould,	the	inconspicuous	edit,	rather	than	introducing	distortion,	allows	greater	fidelity	between	the	performance	and	the	score.	Furthermore,	where	the	performer	is	
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are	best	understood	as	the	product	of	a	performed	deconstruction	of	a	singular	entity,	be	they	a	live	performance	or	a	simulation	of	one.		The	complex	temporal	relationships	evident	above	become	more	complicated	with	the	introduction	of	the	digital	sampler.	Drum	machines	with	sampling	capacity	were	available	from	around	1984	with	the	Linn	900	(developed	by	engineer	Roger	Linn).	Other	drum	machines	including	Roland’s	TR-808	also	utilised	sampling	technology,	but	the	devices	I	am	most	concerned	with	in	the	context	of	enhanced	temporal	relationships	are	those	that	were	designed	to	allow	users	to	record	their	own	samples.	The	most	popular	models	used	in	hip	hop,	the	Emu	SP12	(and	later,	the	SP1200),	and	Roger	Linn’s	MPC	60	(developed	for	Akai),	came	onto	the	market	in	1987	and	1988	respectively.	This	allowed	for	music	producers	to	achieve	the	effect	of	looping	breaks	without	the	labour	intensive	and	highly	skilled	techniques	associated	with	turntablism.	It	also	allowed	for	multiple	recordings	to	be	layered	to	an	extent	that	could	not	have	been	as	easily	achieved	in	previous	years.	The	productions	of	The	Bomb	Squad,	who	were	responsible	for	a	number	of	albums	by	Public	Enemy,	including	their	1987	debut	Yo!	Bum	Rush	the	Show,	exemplified	this	technique.	Bomb	Squad	producer	Hank	Shocklee	recounts	his	experiences	with	Public	Enemy:		 We	 took	 whatever	 was	 annoying,	 threw	 it	 into	 a	 pot,	 and	 that’s	 how	 we	came	out	with	this	group”,	Shocklee	told	Keyboard	magazine,	“We	believed	that	music	 is	 nothing	 but	 organized	 noise.	 You	 can	 take	 anything	 –	 street	sounds,	us	talking,	whatever	you	want	–	and	make	it	music	by	organizing	it.	(Shocklee	in	Toop,	1995,	p.	123)		Hank	Shocklee	here	exudes	a	notably	Cageian	philosophy	towards	sound	and	music,	one	that	is	more	commonly	associated	with	the	post-modern	aesthetics	of	20th	century	western	art	music	than	hip	hop.	It	may	be	argued	that	heavily-layered	hip	hop	of	this	type	finds	connections	with	the	audio	montages	of	musique	concrète,	or	even	Cage’s	own	Rozart	Mix	(1965),	but	unlike	these	earlier	works,	hip	hop	employs	another	layer	that	differentiates	it	from	such	pieces.	This	layer	is	the	performance	of	the	MC(s),	and	it	functions	in	a	way	similar	to	that	of	the	pseudo-document:	it	arrests	the	attention	of	the	listener,	and	thus	
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establishes	a	relationship	between	the	listener	and	the	document	that	is	not	found	in	‘the	work’	focused	phonographs	of	western	art	music.	For	this	reason,	hip	hop	recordings	of	this	nature	represent	an	interesting	kind	of	phonographic	document.	On	the	one	hand,	the	instrumental	aspect	of	the	music	displays	the	curatorial	meta-document	features	described	above,	yet	when	combined	with	a	vocal	performance,	our	reading	of	the	phonograph	can	change	substantially:	despite	acknowledging	that	a	track	is	composed	of	multiple	sources,	the	arresting	power	of	the	vocal	homogenises	the	discrete	performances	that	make	up	the	instrumental	into	a	singular	temporal	event	that	has	the	singular	function	of	‘vocal	accompaniment’.	In	this	way,	the	meta-document	of	hip-hop	assumes	a	pseudo-document	veneer.	I	have	alluded	to	the	power	of	the	human	voice	to	arrest	attentional	focus	previously	in	this	chapter	in	a	discussion	of	The	Beatles	and	their	later	recordings,	and	though	I	will	explore	this	concept	further	in	chapters	five	and	six,	I	will	here	briefly	introduce	the	basic	concept.		
The	human	voice	and	the	meta-document		In	Listening	and	Voice	(2007),	Don	Ihde	considers	the	esthetic	process	of	listening	to	instrumental	music;	that	is,	music	without	vocal	performances.	He	writes:		 In	all	music,	sound	draws	attention	to	itself.	This	is	particularly	the	case	in	wordless	music,	music	 that	 is	 not	 sung.	Here	 the	 “meaning”	 does	 not	 lurk	elsewhere,	but	 it	 is	 in	 the	 sounding	of	 the	music.	There	 is	 even	a	 sense	 in	which	that	the	listening	that	music	calls	for	is	a	different	listening	than	that	called	 for	 by	 word.	 Wordless	 music,	 in	 its	 sonorous	 incarnation,	 when	compared	to	 language	is	“opaque,”	as	nothing	is	shown	through	the	music.	The	music	 presents	 itself;	 it	 is	 a	 dense	 embodied	presence.	 (Ihde	2007,	 p.	155)		In	my	view,	the	opacity	of	instrumental	music	in	recordings,	to	use	Ihde’s	term,	allows	for	the	temporal	relationship	between	performance	and	production	to	be	more	easily	identified.	Indeed,	a	great	number	of	different	aspects	of	the	recording	may	be	attended	to	in	a	recording	without	vocals,	depending	on	the	
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	Elektronische	Musik	is	closely	associated	with	the	Nordwestdeutscher	Rundfunk	(Northwest	German	Broadcasting)	studios	in	Cologne	founded	in	1953	under	the	direction	of	Herbert	Eimert.	The	practices	and	methodologies	of	the	genre	are	well	documented	by	Eimert	(1957),	and	while	its	emergence	marked	the	beginning	of	an	altogether	new	exploration	of	western	art	music’s	materiality	through	electronic	synthesis,	it	is	not	the	novel	aspects	of	Elektronische	Musik	I	am	concerned	with.	Rather,	I	will	focus	on	the	established	ideas,	the	tenacity	of	absolute	music	and	the	enduring	nominalist	composer/work	relationship	in	particular	as	they	contribute	the	most	to	the	status	of	the	phonograph	in	electroacoustic	composition.			There	can	be	little	doubt	that	Elektronische	Musik	was	understood,	above	all,	to	expand	the	repertoire	of	western	art	music.	As	Eimert	writes	in	1957:		 There	 is	 an	 essential	 relationship	 between	 electronic	 music	 and	 the	traditional	 world	 of	 sound,	 not	 only	 the	 fact	 that	 musical	 elements	 are	
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score	of	Studie	II	was	in	fact	published	by	Universal	Edition	Vienna	in	1954.	For	Stockhausen,	there	may	have	been	a	strong	technical	consideration	contributing	to	its	publication,	namely	the	rapid	deterioration	of	early	magnetic	tapes.	In	his	preface	to	Sirius	(1977)	Stockhausen	writes:			 I	 have	 not	 yet	 lost	 all	 hope	 that	 a	 short	 time	 before	 I	 passively	watch	 the	total	 deterioration	 of	 my	 electronic	 tapes,	 someone	 will	 invent	 a	 cunning	device	 which	 will	 translate	 them	 into	 indestructible	 recordings.	(Stockhausen	in	Tannenbaum,	1987,	p.	22)		Stockhausen’s	desire	for	indestructible	recordings	would	be	realised	(in	part)	by	the	introduction	of	digital	recording,	given	the	medium’s	ability	to	accurately	reproduce	the	same	information	without	the	degradation	associated	with	tape.31	However,	for	Stockhausen	the	score	was	not	simply	a	safeguard	against	the	loss	of	recordings.	When	asked	by	Mya	Tannenbaum	in	1980	if	the	reason	for	producing	scores	of	his	electronic	works	was	to	increase	the	size	of	the	audience	‘so	that	from	the	transcriptions,	anyone	–	not	just	Stockhausen	–	will	possess	the	key	to	performing	part	of	the	music	of	Stockhausen?’	Stockhausen	replied:	“in	theory,	it’s	like	that.	In	practice,	no”	(1987,	p.	21).	In	practice,	Stockhausen	believed	that	the	limitations	of	the	score	to	produce	the	exact	result	meant	that	recreations	of	his	works	fell	short.	He	recounts	such	a	remake	at	the	University	of	Stockholm	in	the	1970s	of	Studie	II:	the	phonograph	was	remade	“according	to	the	instructions	published	in	my	score,	but	without	my	collaboration…it	was	awful”	(p.	22).			Stockhausen’s	comment	reveals	a	strong	affinity	with	the	ideas	of	Stravinsky	regarding	the	recording	of	the	latter	composer’s	orchestral	works.	As	discussed	in	chapter	one,	Stravinsky	was	moved	to	record	his	entire	repertoire	of	compositions	so	that	they	might	stand	as	the	definitive	interpretations	of	his	
																																																								31		While	digital	recording	has	a	clear	advantage	over	analog	tape	insofar	as	it	does	not	suffer	from	the	same	kind	of	degradation	associated	with	repeated	plays	and	atmospheric	conditions,	it	does	suffer	from	constant	changes	in	digital	storage	formats,	software	changes,	changes	in	digital	system	interconnectivity	and	so	on.	If	we	assert	that	an	audio	file	must	be	reproduced	in	order	to	hold	value,	then	a	digital	file	is	no	less	‘indestructible’	than	an	analog	recording.	
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work.	Stockhausen	articulates	a	similar	disposition	regarding	his	electronic	works:			 I	hope	that	a	system	of	conversion	[lossless	audio	archiving]	is	completed	as	soon	as	possible,	one	that	can	hand	down	to	the	future	both	my	works	and	my	personally	 recorded	 interpretations.	No	 one	 can	 imagine	 how	 close	 to	my	heart	the	interpretations	are.	I	don’t	say	I	am	the	absolute	holder	of	the	secrets	of	my	music,	and	I	don’t	consider	myself	 their	 interpreter	by	right,	the	only	person	qualified	 to	perform	a	work,	 like	Momente,	 let’s	 say.	But	 I	have	indicated	through	my	interpretations	the	qualitative	goal	to	aim	for	in	the	light	of	my	example.	(1987,	p.	26)		Stockhausen	here	exhibits	just	how	strong	the	nominalist	relationship	between	himself	and	his	electronic	works	is,	and	as	a	matter	of	a	composer’s	intention,	Stockhausen’s	position	is	understandable.	Inspiration	aside	and	despite	the	obvious	technological	and	material	differences,	he	composed	Studie	II	in	much	the	same	way	he	composed	other	pieces	of	instrumental	music.	However,	from	the	perspective	of	a	listener,	it	could	be	argued	that	an	altogether	different	understanding	of	the	work	emerges.			At	first,	we	might	assume	that	a	‘dual	reading’	among	listeners	is	common.	As	the	piece	has	many	similarities	to	instrumental	music,	especially	with	the	inclusion	of	atonal	contrapuntal	lines,	the	piece,	as	Stockhausen	intended,	may	be	understood	as	authored	by	the	composer	and	existing	independently	of	the	recording	(or	indeed	the	score).	We	might	assume	that	this	is	how	Stockhausen	himself	initially	understood	his	piece	upon	audition.	However,	to	a	listener,	the	work	may	become	intrinsically	related	to	the	recording.	As	Mark	Katz	(2004)	would	have	it,	an	individual	may	even	come	to	associate	the	work	with	their	particular	copy	of	the	recording.	It	is	entirely	possible,	even	likely,	that	a	listener	of	the	University	of	Stockholm’s	rendition	of	Studie	II	would	find	it,	as	Stockhausen	did,	inferior	to	the	original	recording,	but	for	an	entirely	different	reason.	For	a	listener,	the	rendition	might	lack	fidelity	to	the	original	recording,	itself	perceived	as	the	work.	While	Stockhausen	might	feel	that	the	Stockholm	recording	lacked	fidelity	to	his	theoretical	conception	of	the	work,	he	does	
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Distinguishing	 an	 element	 (hearing	 it	 in	 itself,	 for	 its	 texture,	 its	 color).		














materials,	the	legacy	of	Schaeffer’s	pursuit	of	absolute	music	continues	to	inform	electroacoustic	composition.	As	Teruggi,	current	director	of	the	GRM,	writes:			 Even	if	the	operational	rules	disappeared	quite	early	in	the	history	of	GRM	and	of	musique	concrète,	 their	 influence	has	continued	through	time	as	an	important	reference	thus	generating	a	kind	of	universal	rule:	do	not	forget	that	a	sound,	before	signifying	something,	 is	a	sound,	and	has	to	be	mainly	considered	 as	 that.	 This	 idea	 permits	 any	 sound	 to	 be	 considered	 as	 a	possible	 sound	 for	 music.	 We	 should	 always	 look	 for	 the	 sound	 ‘itself’!	(2007,	p.	215)		The	tenacity	of	absolute	music	in	electroacoustic	music	practices	is	undeniable,	as	is	the	continued	presence	of	its	longest	and	most	enduring	tension:	how	to	deal	with	mimetic	materials.	Highlighting	this	tension	is	significant,	especially	when	tracing	the	development	of	environmental	sound	composition,	a	genre	that	is	greatly	influenced	by	electroacoustic	composition.	In	order	to	better	understand	this	tension,	it	is	useful	to	trace	perspectives	regarding	mimesis	within	the	electroacoustic	music	community,	examining	both	historical	and	contemporary	assessments.	I	will	now	turn	to	this	topic.		
Mimesis	and	early	electroacoustic	composition		To	reiterate,	mimesis,	as	Emmerson	defines	it,	denotes	‘the	imitation	not	only	of	nature	but	also	of	aspects	of	human	culture	not	usually	associated	directly	with	musical	material’	(1986,	p.	17).	In	addition	to	recordings	of	environments	or	trains,	we	might	include	certain	types	of	sounds	that	imitate	birdsong,	water	or	other	types	of	natural	or	cultural	phenomenon.	As	discussed,	in	the	early	years	of	studio	experimentation,	there	was	simply	no	place	for	mimetic	materials	in	electronic	composition.	Musique	concrète	went	to	great	lengths	to	disguise	the	origins	of	its	materials,	and	though	Elektronische	Musik	used	electronic	instruments	in	place	of	acoustic	instruments,	imitation	of	such	instruments	was	not	the	motivating	force.	Rather,	as	Robin	Maconie	has	it,	‘electronic	music	in	the	postwar	era	was	not	intended	to	sound	natural,	rather	it	was	considered	a	medium	of	sonic	purity’	(2005,	p.	127).	In	this	way,	the	relationship	between	
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39 Jacob, Pierre, "Intentionality", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/intentionality/>. Retrieved 22 August 2014 	
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Let’s	 walk	 together	 through	 a	 great	 modern	 capital,	 with	 the	 ear	 more	attentive	than	the	eye,	and	we	will	vary	the	pleasures	of	our	sensibilities	by	distinguishing	 among	 the	 gurglings	 of	 water,	 air	 and	 gas	 inside	 metallic	pipes,	the	rumblings	and	rattlings	of	engines	breathing	with	obvious	animal	spirits,	 the	 rising	 and	 falling	 of	 pistons,	 the	 stridency	 of	mechanical	 saws,	the	 loud	 jumping	 of	 trolleys	 on	 their	 rails,	 the	 snapping	 of	 whips,	 the	whipping	of	flags.	(Russolo,	1913)		Russolo’s	notion	of	the	‘attentive	ear’	suggests	a	kind	of	aestheticised	listening	to	everyday	sound	that	is,	as	I	will	discuss,	Cageian	in	character.	It	also	contains	aspects	of	Husserlian	bracketing.	Russolo’s	suggestion	that	his	reader	walk	through	a	city	‘with	the	ear	more	attentive	than	the	eye’	suggests	a	cognitive	diminishing	of	visual	perception	in	order	to	promote	aural	perception;	a	kind	of	sensorial	reduction	aimed	at	focusing	on	sound	aesthetically.	Though	Russolo	would	not	marry	his	desires	for	everyday	sound	in	music	with	the	phonograph	(Russolo	instead	invented	intonarumori;	hand-cranked,	noise-making	devices	used	to	imitate	the	sounds	of	industry	and	nature),	other	artists	would.	In	Noise	















Credo	(1937/2004).			In	Noise	Water	Meat	(1999)	Douglas	Kahn	is	critical	of	Cage	on	a	number	of	levels,	but	I	would	like	to	focus	on	one	point	in	particular,	as	it	helps	to	further	refine	Cageian	intentionality.	To	begin	with,	Kahn	summarises	Cage’s	perceptual	revolution	as	follows:		 Russolo	initiated	the	strategy	whereby	extra-musical	sounds	and	worldliness	were	 incorporated	 rhetorically	 or	 in	 fact	 into	music	 to	 reinvigorate	 it.	 Cage	exhausted	this	strategy	by	extending	the	process	of	incorporation	to	a	point	to	every	 audible	 sounds,	 potentially	 audible	 and	 mythically	 audible	 sounds,	where	consequently	there	existed	no	more	sounds	to	incorporate	into	music,	and	he	formalized	the	performance	of	music	to	where	it	could	be	dependent	on	listening	alone.		(1999,	p.	164)		And	later:		 After	 a	 certain	 point	 communication,	 ideas	 and	 intention	 were	 also	 to	 be	expunged	so	all	that	was	left	was	a	sound	in	itself.	This	tendency	in	Cage	was	a	measure	of	the	degree	to	which	he	was	lodged	within	Western	art	music	and	how	willing	he	was	to	carry	 further	 its	processes	of	exclusion	and	reduction	with	 respect	 to	 sound	 in	 general.	 It	 was	 as	 though	 he	 could	 legitimately	extend	 the	 bounds	 of	 musical	 materiality	 only	 by	 proving	 an	 unflinching	fidelity	to	musical	areferentiality	on	its	own	turf.	(p.	164-165)		Kahn’s	criticism	of	Cage	is	that	his	perceptual	revolution	was	only	made	possible	through	the	uneasy	framing	of	environmental	sound	with	a	strictly	formalist	perception.	Regardless	of	Cage’s	rational	for	this	specific	intentionality,	there	can	be	little	doubt	that	absolute	music	influenced	his	situated	listening	practices.	As	Kahn	has	it,	Cage	dismissed	the	notion	that	‘sound’	held	an	ability	to	communicate	ideas:	“If	I	am	going	to	listen	to	a	speech,	then	I	would	like	to	hear	
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and	Silence	(2010).	Voegelin’s	book	is	especially	pertinent	to	this	discussion	in	that	it	addresses	both	situated	and	mediated	listening	practices.	To	begin,	Voegelin	makes	this	assertion:			 Every	 sensory	 interaction	 relates	 back	 to	 us	 not	 the	 object/phenomenon	perceived,	 but	 that	 object/phenomenon	 filtered	 shaped	 and	 produced	 by	the	sense	employed	 in	 its	perception.	At	 the	same	time	 this	sense	outlines	and	 fills	 the	perceiving	body,	which	 in	 its	perception	shapes	and	produces	his	sensory	self.	Whereby	the	senses	employed	are	already	ideologically	and	aesthetically	 determined,	 bringing	 their	 own	 influence	 to	 perception,	 the	perceptual	object	and	the	perceptual	subject.	(2010,	p.	3)		Voegelin’s	listening	is	understood	as	engaging	not	only	the	object,	but	also	the	self.	As	such,	listening,	for	Voegelin,	produces	both	a	Husserlian	noema	and	bodily	awareness.	Voegelin’s	appraisal	of	perception	is	without	doubt	indebted	to	Husserl	and	Ihde,	but	placing	further	emphasis	on	bodily	awareness,	which	aligns	her	approach	with	the	phenomenology	of	Merleau-Ponty,	a	phenomenology	that	includes	the	notion	of	embodied	cognition,	in	which	the	body	itself	is	understood	
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as	a	filter	through	which	hyletic	data	must	pass	through.	This	kind	of	phenomenology	is	echoed	by	anthropologist	Tim	Ingold,	who	insists	that	sound	is	not	‘the	surfaces	of	the	world	in	which	we	live’,	that	is,	a	series	of	sounding	bodies,	but	rather	the	medium	within	which	we	perceive:		 Sound,	 like	 breath,	 is	 experienced	 as	 a	 movement	 of	 coming	 and	 going,	inspiration	and	expiration.	If	that	is	so,	then	we	should	say	of	the	body,	as	it	sings,	 hums,	whistles	 or	 speaks,	 that	 it	 is	 ensounded.	 It	 is	 like	 setting	 sail,	launching	 the	 body	 into	 sound	 like	 a	 boat	 on	 the	waves	 or,	 perhaps	more	appropriately,	like	a	kite	in	the	sky.	(Ingold,	2007,	p.	12)				This	understanding	of	sound	positions	embodied	cognition	at	the	centre	of	aural	experience.	It	follows	then	that	composer	intentionality	is	not	informed	by	the	‘surfaces’	of	sound,	surfaces	that	may	arguably	be	detected	through	the	phonograph,	but	rather	composer	intentionality	is	informed	by	the	ensounding	of	the	composer;	a	unique	experience	that	merges	bodily	awareness,	past	experiences	and	attentional	focus.	The	composer’s	embodied	cognition	is	necessarily	absent	in	the	recordings	they	make,	and	therefore	this	aspect	is	unavailable	to	a	listener,	though	a	composer	may	(unconsciously)	believe	otherwise.	Voegelin	provides	an	account	of	her	experience	at	Waterlow	Park	that	illustrates	the	extent	to	which	her	past	experiences	play	into	her	noetic	processes:		 To	 listen	 to	Waterlow	 Park	 at	 dawn	 is	 to	 generate	 its	morning-park-ness	and	my	morning-self	from	the	midst	of	its	sounds.	I	merge	the	city	hum	with	the	 fresh	bird	song,	 the	occasional	dog	walker’s	call	and	a	 jogger’s	panting	breath	with	the	sounds	of	my	auditory	imagination	for	which	I	cannot	name	a	 source.	 The	 bird’s	 song,	 the	 traffic	 hum,	 the	 runner’s	 breath	 and	 the	master’s	 whistle	 recall	 a	 sonic	 objectivity	 as	 a	 residue	 of	 all	 my	 earlier	subjective	 generative	 appreciations	 of	 such	 sounds.	 The	 objective	 brings	with	 it	 the	 park	 as	 cultural	 notion,	 and	 all	 the	 parks	 I	 have	 ever	 visited.	Intertwining	 in	 my	 ears	 this	 left	 over	 objectivity	 with	 my	 present	subjectivity	 the	 sounds	 are	 produced	 beyond	what	 they	 are	 in	 a	 fantastic	but	plausible	reality	of	what	I	have	them	to	be.	(2010,	p.	13)		
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Voegelin’s	account	of	this	situated	listening	experience	highlights	how	profoundly	different	listening	experiences	are	between	people.	As	such,	Voegelin’s	‘morning-park-ness’	is	not	only	different	from	that	of	other	park-goers,	but	it	is	thoroughly	unique	to	her.	Though	her	account	of	listening	is	compelling,	the	question	of	whether	an	individual	can	in	fact	meaningfully	perceive	mono-modally	in	situ	is	not	addressed.	Certainly	we	can	focus	our	attention	on	one	sense	more	than	another,	but	to	what	extent	do	our	individual	senses	inform	each	other?	In	other	words,	how	much	is	Voegelin’s	aural	‘morning-park-ness’	informed	by	its	visual	counterpart?	In	my	opinion,	Voegelin’s	morning-park-ness	is	informed	as	much	by	her	other	senses,	sight,	smell,	taste	and	touch,	though	she	may	be	attending	to	the	aural.			Anthropologist	Tim	Ingold	might	agree	with	my	assertion.	He	writes:			 The	 environment	 that	 we	 experience,	 know	 and	 move	 around	 in	 is	 not	sliced	up	along	the	lines	of	the	sensory	pathways	by	which	we	enter	into	it.	The	world	we	perceive	is	the	same	world,	whatever	path	we	take,	and	each	of	us	perceives	it	as	an	undivided	centre	of	activity	and	awareness.	For	this	reason	 I	 deplore	 the	 fashion	 of	multiplying	 scapes	 of	 every	 possible	 kind.	The	power	of	the	prototypical	concept	of	the	landscape	lies	precisely	in	the	fact	 that	 it	 is	 not	 tied	 to	 any	 specific	 sensory	 register	 –	 whether	 vision,	hearing,	 touch,	 smell	 or	 whatever.	 In	 ordinary	 perceptual	 practice	 these	registers	cooperate	so	closely,	and	with	such	overlap	of	function,	that	their	respective	contributions	are	impossible	to	tease	apart.	(Ingold,	2007,	p.	10)		Hildegard	Westerkamp’s	soundscape	work	Kits	Beach	Soundwalk	(1989)	pulls	this	idea	into	sharp	focus.	The	work	is	often	cited	as	an	important	work	of	the	genre,	and	has	been	included	in	many	discussions	of	sound	art,	including	Voegelin	(2010)	and	Labelle	(2007),	with	a	more	focused	analysis	made	by	Kolber	(2002).	Kits	Beach	Soundwalk	makes	use	of	recordings	made	at	central	Vancouver’s	Kitsilano	Beach,	with	narration	from	the	composer.	Westerkamp	begins	by	detailing	the	atmospheric	conditions,	geographic	location	and	time	of	year.	She	then	draws	attention	to	the	technology	in	use,	and	in	doing	so	reveals	a	great	deal	about	her	situated	listening	experience:		
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recording	(2013).	In	this	book,	18	environmental	sound	composers	are	interviewed	about	their	practices.	Jana	Winderen,	when	asked	if	she	would	consider	using	field	recordings	in	her	work	that	she	did	not	record,	has	this	to	say:			 So	 much	 would	 be	 lost	 if	 I	 were	 to	 do	 that	 –	 I’d	 have	 no	 sense	 of	 the	temperature,	or	of	the	weather,	or	how	accessible	the	place	was	or	what	the	
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skipper	of	the	boat	or	the	local	fisherman	told	me	about	the	sites.	All	of	that	adds	to	the	story	I	am	trying	to	tell	(Winderen	in	Carlyle	and	Lane,	2013,	p.		156).			Winderen’s	connectedness	with	situated	experience	appears	crucial	in	the	production	of	her	compositions,	and	yet	without	direct	access	to	the	kind	of	geographic	and	atmospheric	conditions,	local	stories	or	any	other	non-auditory	information,	a	listener	is	unlikely	to	hear	her	stories	as	she	intended,	most	likely	making	up	their	own	or	disregarding	narrative	altogether.	With	a	degree	of	irony,	Winderen’s	reluctance	to	use	other	people’s	recordings	for	composition	is	born	of	her	disconnection	from	the	source	environment;	the	exact	experience	that	others	may	have	when	hearing	her	work.	Other	composers	may	not	be	focused	on	engagement	with	the	non-auditory	as	Winderen	appears	to	be,	though	such	senses	undoubtedly	influence	their	decision-making	during	recording	and	post-production.	For	these	composers,	while	non-auditory	senses	may	sit	tacitly	in	the	background	in	situ,	so	too	may	they	tacitly	reemerge	upon	audition.	In	fact,	a	recording	may	act	as	a	memory	trigger	not	just	for	other	sensorial	information,	but	also	for	the	total	embodied	experience.	Winderen’s	comment	above	attests	to	this	idea.	I	believe	this	experiential	transition	from	the	composer	in	the	field	to	the	composer	listening	back	in	the	studio	plays	a	key	role	in	many	works	of	soundscape	composition.	The	belief	that	more	than	just	auditory	information	can	be	conveyed	through	sound	is	the	crux	of	yet	another	conviction:	that	field	recordings	have	the	power	to	educate	a	listener	about	an	environment.	This	is	an	idea	I	will	discuss	at	length	in	chapter	four.			As	Winderen’s	comments	suggest,	it	is	also	true	that	a	composer	may	find	their	recording	disappointing	(just	as	Toop	and	Ihde	expressed)	and	such	a	lack	of	reengagement	with	the	fullness	of	in	situ	experience	may	lead	to	specific	types	of	manipulation	of	the	recording,	as	Christina	Kubisch	recounts:		 When	you	are	recording	it	heightens	your	perception	and	you	become	very	sensitive	 to	 everything	 around	 you,	 it	 becomes	 an	 incredibly	 intense	experience.	 Then	 when	 you	 listen	 to	 your	 recordings	 afterwards	 in	 the	studio	 you’re	 often	 disappointed	 because	 it’s	 just	 the	 sound	 and	 not	 the	
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experience	and	so	you	have	to	change	and	rearrange	the	material	in	order	to	bring	back	that	original	sensation.	(Kubisch	in	Carlyle	and	Lane,	2013,	p.	70)		Kubisch’s	comment	is	revealing,	and	while	Westerkamp’s	Kits	Beach	Soundwalk	may	not	have	been	written	out	of	disappointment,	there	is	a	commonality	here	in	production	methodology.	In	my	experience,	a	composer	may	be	‘often	disappointed’	but	not	always	disappointed.	I	have	had	both	experiences	with	my	own	recordings,	and	I	believe	this	is	probably	true	for	many;	while	one	recording	may	magically	re-create	‘the	original	sensation’	or	extra-auditory	context	for	the	composer,	another	recording	may	not:	the	composer	hears	only	the	‘second	musicalisation’	of	the	recorder	on	playback,	that	is,	the	environment	recorded	without	the	composer’s	situated	intentional	bracket	(the	first	musicalisation).		What	is	revealed	here	is	this:	to	varying	levels,	a	composer	may	engage	with	situated	experience	upon	audition	of	a	recording.	I	believe	that	even	at	the	formalist	end	of	the	spectrum,	where	we	might	find	the	compositions	of	Francisco	Lopez,	a	composer	will	engage	with	elements	not	present	in	the	sonic	material;	though	Lopez	may	champion	an	environment’s	capacity	for	self-referentiality	(1997),	other	references	may	influence	his	works.	In	other	words,	though	a	composer	like	Lopez	may	feel	no	desire	to	recreate	situated	experience	in	their	work,	focusing	instead	on	the	acousmatic	result	(1997),	I	believe	that	compositional	process	alone,	that	is,	the	activities	surrounding	the	act	of	recording,	may	not	only	be	enough	to	engage	a	composer	with	the	past	and	influence	their	decision-making,	but	may	also	be	a	deeply	engaging	and	motivating	factor	in	the	compositional	process.	As	such,	while	many	composers,	like	Westerkamp,	undoubtedly	find	the	ecological	or	narrative	context	ascribed	to	the	environment	to	be	a	motivational	force	in	their	works,	others	may	find	the	fuller	context	of	field	recording	itself	to	be	motivational.	Davide	Tidoni	might	agree.	He	notes	this	of	some	drum	kit	recordings	he	made	in	his	basement	as	a	teenager:		 On	 a	 very	 biographical	 level,	 those	 tapes	 bring	me	 back	 to	 the	 emotional	feelings	 and	 relational	 context	 under	 which	 I	 was	 recording.	 Those	recordings	 are	 not	 only	 about	 what	 is	 taped	 itself…	 but	 actually	 concern	
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Many	composers	who	work	with	untransformed	field	recordings	identify	with	the	genre	of	phonography.	The	history	of	the	genre	may	be	traced	back	to	works	prior	to	Ferrari’s	Presque	Rien	No.	1	(1970).	Pauline	Oliveros	made	a	48-minute	recording	of	the	San	Diego	Zoo	in	1968	that	was	aired	on	radio	station	KPFA’s	World	Ear	Project	in	the	early	1970s.46	Walter	Ruttmann’s	Wochenende	(1930)	has	elements	of	phonography,	though	it	is	a	heavily	edited	piece.	Though	the	history	of	phonography	is	a	rich	and	fascinating	area	of	research,	I	can	here	only	note	that	it	is	a	practice	undertaken	by	a	large	variety	of	people,	evident	in	the	vast	number	of	recordings	currently	available	for	audition	on	sites	including	soundcloud.com,	bandcamp.com,	freesound.org,	along	with	the	more	targeted	sites	such	as	those	operated	by	labels	including	Touch	(UK),	Gruenrekorder	(Germany),	Green	Field	Recordings	(Portugal),	and	Sub	Rosa	(Belgium).			Isaac	Sterling,	a	phonographer	and	contributor	at	phonography.org	summarises	well	the	attitudes	of	those	who	identify	with	the	practice:		 The	 simple	 answer	 is	 that	 phonography	 (literally	 “sound	 writing”)	 refers	 to	field	 recording.	 This	 entails	 the	 capture	 of	 any	 event	 that	 can	 be	 reproduced	and	 represented	 as	 sound.	 Auditory	 events	 are	 selected,	 framed	 by	 duration	and	method	of	capture,	and	presented	in	a	particular	format	and	context,	all	of	which	 distinguishes	 a	 recording	 from	 the	 original	 event	 during	which	 it	 was	captured.	 In	 this	 respect,	 phonography	 is	 analogous	 to	 any	 other	 form	 of	recording.	 It	 is	 distinct	 from	 recording	 in	 general	 only	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 the	capture	of	sound	is	privileged	over	its	production.	This	bias	reflects	an	attempt	to	discover	rather	than	invent.47		Sterling’s	view	may	at	first	appear	contradictory.	He	assigns	authorship	to	the	composer,	in	that	their	method	of	capture	‘distinguishes	a	recording	from	the	original	event’.	At	the	same	time,	he	insists	that	phonography	exhibits	a	bias	to	‘discover	rather	than	invent’,	which	moves	authorship	away	from	the	composer	to	the	event	itself.	This	particular	emphasis	recalls	Goehr’s	Platonist	view	of	the	work,	in	which	she	states	‘to	compose	a	work	is	less	to	create	a	kind,	than	it	is	to																																																									46	Richard	Friedman	and	Charles	Amirkhanian	established	the	World	Ear	Project	at	Berkeley’s	KPFA,	a	radio	program	that	requested	and	played	hundreds	of	field	recordings	from	its	listeners	from	all	over	the	world.	The	first	series	ran	for	3	years	from	1970	47	Sterling,	Isaac:	“What	is	Phonography?”	(http://phonography.org/whatis.htm,	accessed	14/4/2008)	
	 	 123	
discover	one’	(1992,	p.	14),	though	it	is	unclear	to	me	if	Sterling’s	conception	of	the	work	in	phonography	is	truly	nominalist.	Regardless	of	where	Sterling	believes	authorship	and	the	work	reside	in	phonography,	his	statement	recognises	the	two	essential	features	of	the	phonograph	that	I	argued	for	in	chapter	one.	Abstraction	is	noted	in	the	distinction	between	the	recording	and	the	original	event,	while	documentary	is	noted	in	the	desire	to	discover	what	is	nonetheless	captured,	albeit	as	a	trace	of	the	past	event.	I	will	discuss	the	notion	of	the	‘trace’	in	greater	detail	in	chapter	four,	but	here	I	will	reiterate	that	though	the	event	itself	is	not	present	in	its	recording,	aspects	of	it	are	embedded	in	the	phonograph	as	traces	of	a	past	reality.	This	duality	of	documentary	and	abstraction	in	the	phonograph	does	not	sit	so	easily	within	the	more	dogmatic	practice	of	soundscape	composition,	or	in	acousmatic	music	practices	more	generally:	indeed	it	is	the	pitting	of	documentary	against	abstraction	that	is	often	the	very	source	of	the	tension	between	formalism	and	mimesis	in	electroacoustic	works.48	The	difficulty	in	acknowledging	and	accounting	for	abstraction	and	documentary	in	field	recording	is	evident	within	the	two	predominant	conceptions	of	abstraction	promoted	within	environmental	sound	composition.		To	begin	with,	I	would	like	to	examine	phonographic	abstraction	as	the	reduction	of	multi-modal	experience	to	a	single	mode	(the	aural	mode),	to	be	experienced	at	a	later	time,	and	often	at	a	different	location.	R.	Murray	Schafer	coined	the	term	‘schizophonia’	to	describe	this	phenomenon:		 The	Greek	prefix	schizo	means	split,	separated;	and	phone	is	Greek	for	voice.	











I	 am	professor	 of	 Ecology	 and	 I	 have	 been	 recording	 and	 composing	with	sound	environments	since	more	than	fifteen	years	ago.	Although	I	am	quite	aware	 of	 the	 obvious	 relationships	 between	 all	 the	 properties	 of	 a	 real	environment,	 I	 think	 is	 an	 essential	 feature	 of	 the	 human	 condition	 to	artistically	deal	with	any	aspect(s)	of	this	reality.	(Lopez,	1997)		Lopez	clearly	has	a	very	distinct	intentional	perspective.	In	situ,	he	has	a	specific	set	of	experiences	that	enable	him	to	constitute	the	environment	from	the	perspective	of	an	ecologist,	though	this	is	truly	an	oversimplification	of	what	is	undoubtedly	a	multi-faceted	engagement.	In	terms	of	his	artistic	intervention,	Lopez	deals	with	the	aural	‘aspect	of	this	reality’,	by	recording	it,	and	insisting	that	such	a	recording	has	‘the	full	right	to	be	self-referential’	(Lopez,	1997).	As	such,	Lopez	seeks	no	recourse	to	the	environment	through	recording:	he	considers	the	two	as	ontologically	distinct.	In	essence,	Lopez	acknowledges	and	champions	the	singular	and	irrefutable	ontology	of	the	phonograph,	yet,	he	does	so	at	the	expense	of	another.	As	I	will	discuss	shortly,	Lopez	employs	a	very	similar	methodology	to	Pierre	Schaeffer	in	promotion	of	abstraction,	one	in	which	the	documentary	power	of	recorded	sound	must	be	muted.		The	second	reading	of	abstraction	promotes	a	reflexive	relationship	in	which	environments	(or	at	least	responses	to	them)	are	informed	and	modified	by	their	recording.	Such	a	relationship	seems	plausible	in	instances	where	the	intentional	object	of	an	event	is	understood	in	broad	terms:	a	jazz	recording	may	promote	new	practices	in	jazz	performance,	for	example.50	However,	in	instances	where	an	event	is	considered	tied	to	its	original	temporal	expression	(such	as	a	specific	concert),	or	where	the	event	recorded	lacks	human	intentionality	(such	as	an	environment),	schismogenesis	seems	less	applicable,	given	the	inability	of	a	listener’s	present	intentionality	to	modify	past	events.			Both	of	these	conceptions	are	problematic.	To	begin	with,	though	schismogenesis	acknowledges	the	documentary	power	of	the	phonograph	through	the	promotion	of	another	power;	that	is,	the	power	of	recordings	to	modify	potential	future	events,	it	does	not	address	the	actual	relationship	that																																																									50	Mark	Katz	dedicates	a	chapter	of	his	book	Capturing	Sound	(2010,	p.	80-94)	to	this	subject.	
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contemporary	phonography	in	many	ways	lives	in	the	shadow	of	soundscape	theory	and	indeed	soundscape	composition.	His	paper	deals	with	the	practices	of	sound	artists	Chris	Watson,	Peter	Cusack,	Kiyoshi	Mitzutani,	Toshiya	Tsunoda,	Jacob	Kirkegaard	and	Stephen	Vitiello,	none	of	whom	identify	with	the	soundscape	movement,	and	each	of	whom	have	unique	approaches	to	and	understandings	of	the	sonic	environment.	Just	as	Montgomery	does,	I	wish	to	consider	contemporary	environmental	sound	composition,	including	my	own,	as	removed	from	soundscape	composition,	though	as	stated,	in	order	to	do	so,	it	is	necessary	to	investigate	the	genre’s	ideological	influence.	In	analysing	soundscape	composition,	I	will	argue	that	though	it	is	an	important	form	of	the	environmental	sound	composition,	it	should	not	be	considered	the	central	practice	around	which	all	others	are	orientated	and	understood.	In	my	view,	soundscape	composition	has	effectively	colonised	environmental	sound	composition,	even	if	inadvertently,	through	its	focus	on	acoustic	ecology,	and	in	doing	so	has	polarised	the	community,	as	well	as	influenced	discussions	on	how	environmental	sound	composition	should	be	understood.	Francisco	Lopez’	paper	“Schizophonia	vs	l’objet	sonore:	soundscapes	and	artistic	freedom”	(1997)	is	exemplary	of	what	is	now	a	growing	challenge	to	the	importance	of	soundscape	theory	within	the	genre.	His	paper	also	indicates	just	how	pervasive	the	influence	of	soundscape	theory	continues	to	be.	Though	many	contemporary	composers	seek	to	create	new	forms	of	environmental	sound	composition	using	various	aesthetic	methodologies	and	technical	processes,	the	tensions	stemming	from	soundscape	composition	are	never	far	from	the	surface.			As	I	will	detail	shortly,	some	soundscape	composers	question	the	validity	of	phonographic	works	that	are	not	clearly	aligned	with	the	concerns	of	acoustic	ecology.	The	root	of	this	attitude	can	be	found	in	the	views	of	R.	Murray	Schafer,	who	questions	the	artistic	value	of	field	recordings	when	describing	his	own	work	with	the	World	Soundscape	Project	in	the	early	1970s:		 A	lot	of	these	recorded	soundscapes	began	to	be	[Schafer	laughs]	regarded	as	 art.	 And	 it	 started	 actually	 in	 Germany	 with	 quite	 a	 famous	 German	producer,	 radio	 producer,	 by	 the	 name	 of	 Klaus	 Schöning,	 at	 the	 West	German	 Radio	 in	 Cologne.	 He	 played	 the	 whole	 of	 the	 Vancouver	
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Soundscape	 recording	 as	 if	 it	 were	 a	 new	 kind	 of	 composition,	 a	 musical	composition	 that	we’d	put	 together,	 and	he	got	 so	excited	about	 it	 that	he	then	commissioned	more	city	portraits.	(Schafer,	2005)		Schafer	continues,		 However,	my	purpose	and	our	purpose	was	not	 to	make	works	of	art,	but	simply	 [to]	 supply	 ourselves	 with	 a	 catalogue	 of	 information;	 sound	information	that	we	could	measure	(2005)		Schafer,	heavily	invested	in	acoustic	ecology,	may	have	found	no	artistic	value	in	field	recording,	a	view	that	is	hardly	surprising	given	his	concept	of	schizophonia.	His	colleagues	however,	particularly	Hildegard	Westerkamp	and	Barry	Truax,	would	find	ways	to	bend	their	inherent	desire	to	work	creatively	with	field	recordings	to	fit	the	concerns	of	the	movement.	Westerkamp	describes	this	process,	stating	that	soundscape	composition	‘can	make	use	of	the	schizophonic	medium	to	awaken	our	curiosity	and	to	create	a	desire	for	deeper	knowledge	and	information	about	our	own	as	well	as	other	places	and	cultures.’	(2002,	p.	52)	Soundscape	composition,	as	it	eventually	became	known,	would	become	a	creative	arm	of,	and	perhaps	even	a	promotional	tool	for,	the	concerns	of	acoustic	ecology	and	soundscape	studies.			As	mentioned,	some	composers	question	the	value	of	environmental	sound	compositions	that	do	not	reflect	the	concerns	of	acoustic	ecology.	Westerkamp	is	exemplary	in	this	regard.	In	her	paper	“Linking	Soundscape	Composition	and	Acoustic	Ecology”	(2002),	Westerkamp	makes	clear	the	relationship	between	soundscape	composition	and	acoustic	ecology,	suggesting	that	the	link	between	the	two	is	what	gives	meaning	to	environmental	sound	composition.	In	her	paper,	she	recounts	the	words	of	composer	Michael	Rüsenberg	when	describing	one	of	his	works.	Detailing	a	particularly	noisy	tram	station	in	Germany,	Rüsenberg	argues	for	a	distinction	between	an	acoustic	ecologist	and	soundscape	composer:		
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The	acoustic	ecologist	would	 rather	do	a	noise	 level	 survey	 from	different	perspectives	and	conduct	 interviews	with	 commuters.	But	 the	 soundscape	composer	–	very	perversely	–	might	discover	for	example,	the	beauty	within	the	Doppler	effect	of	a	passing	Harley	Davidson	and	enhance	the	descending	pitch.	(Rüsenberg	in	Westerkamp,	2002,	p.	54)		Rüsenberg	displays	an	unusual	perspective.	Here,	he	considers	himself	a	soundscape	composer	without	being	an	acoustic	ecologist.	His	particular	interest	in	this	environment	is	based	in	its	spatio-	and	spectromorphological	properties.	Westerkamp	questions	this	stance:		 If	 certain	 aspects	 of	 a	 soundscape	 recording	 become	 enhanced	 through	processing,	what	 is	 the	 composer	 trying	 to	 say	with	 this	 and	 how	 does	 it	contribute	 to	 a	 deeper	 understanding	 or	 a	 renewed	 relationship	 to	 the	soundscape	or	 to	 our	 own	 listening.	Or,	 if	 processing	 is	 done	 for	 the	pure	pleasure	 of	 it,	 why	 would	 the	 composer	 want	 to	 create	 a	 soundscape	 of	noise	 in	 the	 concert	 hall?...	 is	 it	 not	 the	 soundscape	 composer’s	responsibility	to	act	like	an	acoustic	ecologist?	(2002,	p.	54)		Westerkamp	may	be	correct	in	this	regard.	Many	would	agree	that	soundscape	composition	and	acoustic	ecology	are	forever	connected	through	the	work	of	Schafer	and	the	World	Soundscape	Project.	However,	what	if	Rüsenberg	did	not	identify	himself	as	a	soundscape	composer?	It	seems	to	me	his	stance	is	rather	less	dogmatic	than	that	of	Westerkamp.	In	fact,	his	intentional	bracketing	finds	greater	commonality	with	Cage	or	Lopez.	I	argue	that	Westerkamp	would	level	the	same	criticism	at	Rüsenberg	regardless	of	how	he	perceives	himself.	For	Westerkamp,	meaning	is	imbedded	in	the	materials	themselves,	and	a	composer	





	The	term	‘soundscape’	was	coined	by	Schafer	in	the	late	1960s	and	thoroughly	discussed	in	his	influential	book	The	Tuning	of	the	World	(1977).	In	essence,	Schafer’s	soundscape	is	analogous	to	landscape	(though	Ingold	clearly	refutes	this	comparison,	as	noted	earlier).	At	a	basic	level	it	denotes	all	sounds	heard	in	a	particular	environment.	However,	Schafer’s	understanding	of	soundscape	is	not	this	prosaic.	Indeed,	his	detailing	of	it	reveals	a	very	particular	stance	regarding	how	it	should	be	researched,	comprehended	and	ultimately,	orchestrated:		 Today,	 all	 sounds	 belong	 to	 a	 continuous	 field	 of	 possibilities	 lying	within	the	 comprehensive	 domain	 of	music.	 Behold	 the	 new	 orchestra:	 the	 sonic	universe!	And	the	new	musicians:	anyone	and	anything	that	sounds!	(1977,	p.	5)		With	an	enthusiasm	redolent	of	an	Italian	Futurist,	Schafer	proclaimed	the	world	a	musical	orchestra.	Unlike	Cage’s	environmental	orchestra,	Schafer’s	idea	of	a	new	‘orchestra’	with	new	‘musicians’	was	underpinned	by	a	new	notion:	that	of	good	music	and	bad	music.	The	positing	of		‘anyone	and	anything	that	sounds’	as	musicians	in	an	orchestra,	implies	that	‘the	piece’,	or	‘the	soundscape’,	had	the	potential	to	be	ruined	by	a	poor	performance.	In	fact,	Schafer	believed	that	the	soundscape	had	already	been	ruined	by	the	industrial	and	electric	revolutions,	and	his	mission	became	that	of	defining	a	good	soundscape	and	training	hitherto	oblivious	musicians	to	improve	it.	As	such,	Schafer	became	chiefly	concerned	with	the	removal	of	certain	sounds	from	the	soundscape	(noise	abatement)	and	the	championing	of	others	(preservation)	in	order	to	keep	the	soundscape	‘hi-fi’:		 The	 soundscape	 is	 no	 accidental	 byproduct	 of	 society;	 rather	 it	 is	 a	deliberate	construction	by	its	creators,	a	composition	that	may	be	as	much	distinguished	for	its	beauty	as	for	its	ugliness.	When	a	society	fumbles	with	sound,	when	it	does	not	comprehend	the	principles	of	decorum	and	balance	in	 soundmaking,	 when	 it	 does	 not	 understand	 that	 there	 is	 a	 time	 to	
	 	 143	
produce	 and	 a	 time	 to	 shut	 up,	 the	 soundscape	 slips	 from	 hi-fi	 to	 lo-fi	condition,	and	ultimately	consumes	itself	in	cacophony.	(1977,	p.	237)		Though	Schafer	has	acknowledged	the	influence	Cage	had	on	his	concept,53	it	seems	unlikely	that	Cage	would	share	his	enthusiasm	for	such	a	composition.	During	his	career,	Cage	sought	to	diminish	the	presence	of	the	composer	in	his	compositions,	instead	opting	for	chance	procedures	and	advocating	for	composing	with	‘indifference’.54		Schafer’s	view	of	the	soundscape	and	its	orchestration	was	not	an	indifferent	one.				The	work	of	the	World	Soundscape	Project	can	be	summarised	as	an	empirical	evaluation	of	the	aesthetically	pleasing	and	displeasing	sounds	found	in	a	soundscape	conducted	through	extensive	interviews,	questionnaires	and	audio	recordings.	The	project	also	sought	to	classify	soundscape	features	in	terms	of	their	communicative	qualities	and	cultural	significance,	while	encouraging	reduced	noise	levels	and	the	preservation	of	important	sounds	as	identified	by	communities.55	Given	this,	the	obvious	criticism	of	Schafer’s	soundscape	is	that	it	makes	judgments	regarding	the	aesthetic	value	of	sounds	within	the	environment	that	have	potentially	far-reaching	consequences.	Schafer	acknowledges	this	criticism:		 Sorting	sounds	according	to	their	aesthetic	qualities	is	probably	the	hardest	of	all	types	of	classification.	Sounds	affect	individuals	differently	and	a	single	sound	 will	 often	 stimulate	 such	 a	 wide	 assortment	 of	 reactions	 that	 the	researcher	 can	 easily	 become	 confused	 or	 dispirited.	 As	 a	 result,	 study	 of	this	 problem	 has	 been	 thought	 too	 subjective	 to	 yield	meaningful	 results.	Out	 in	the	real	world,	however,	aesthetic	decisions	of	great	 importance	for	the	 changing	 soundscape	 are	 constantly	 being	 made,	 often	 arbitrarily.	(1977,	p.	146)		
																																																								
53 In his pamphlet The Music of the Environment (1973/2004), Schafer acknowledges the ideas of Cage as 
influential in his concept of the soundscape 
54 See Douglas Kahn (1999, p. 165-174) for an interesting appraisal of Cage’s philosophy during the 1940s 
55 A detailed summary of the World Soundscape Project and its activities can be found at the Simon Fraser 
University Website: http://www.sfu.ca/~truax/wsp.html (accessed 3/7/12) 
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Given	Schafer’s	attitude	towards	industries	that	produce	excessive	noise,	and	his	resolve	to	combat	such	pollution	through	research,	education	and	political	lobbying,	he	might	be	forgiven	for	subjecting	the	world	to	his	own	utopian	attitude	to	the	sonic	environment.	In	my	view,	his	work	in	the	1960s	and	1970s	to	raise	awareness	of	noise	pollution	and	sonic	preservation	should	not	be	undervalued.	By	way	of	example,	the	introduction	of	the	Environmental	Noise	
(England)	Regulations	(2006)	prompted	the	Department	for	Environment	Food	and	Rural	Affairs	to	produce	the	Noise	Mapping	England	website,	a	site	which	maps	noise	levels	in	urban	centers	across	England	and	is	intended	as	a	resource	for	noise	action	plans	for	various	industries.56	These	kinds	of	local	and	national	noise	plans	and	resources	can	trace	their	roots	back	to	Schafer’s	pioneering	work	of	this	period.	Despite	the	widespread	success	of	Schafer’s	work	in	raising	concern	regarding	noise	and	noise	pollution,	in	recent	years	a	number	of	voices	have	arisen	that	criticise	Schafer’s	concept	of	the	soundscape.		The	criticism	that	Schafer’s	work	is	too	subjective	is	encapsulated	in	the	statement	‘distant	ambulance	sirens	may	be	one	person’s	purgatory	and	another’s	poetry’	(Toop,	1995,	p.	253).	However,	the	extent	to	which	subjectivity	pervades	soundscape	studies	has	far	greater	consequences	than	this	suggests.	In	his	article	“Rethinking	the	Soundscape”	(2010),	Ari	Y.	Kelman	insists	that	in	promoting	a	‘hi-fi’	soundscape	(one	with	a	large	dynamic	range	between	the	‘noise	floor’	and	‘important’	sounds)	over	a	‘lo-fi’	soundscape	(one	with	little	or	no	differentiation	between	noise	and	preferred	sounds),	Schafer	is	essentially	marginalising	sonic	experience	in	urban	environments.	Kelman	cites	Sophie	Arkette	as	taking	exception	to	this:			 to	 say	 that	 the	 urban	 supervenes	 upon	 the	 natural	 soundscape,	 and	 that	urban	sounds	can	be	cleaned	up	 to	 resemble	natural	 sounds	 is	 to	misread	the	 dynamics	 of	 city	 spaces.	 A	 city	 wouldn’t	 exist	 if	 it	 mirrored	 agrarian	sonic	space.	(Arkette	in	Kelman,	2010,	p.	217)		
																																																								













Mono-modality	in	soundscape	composition		In	addition	to	criticisms	of	Schafer’s	subjective	and	sometimes	poorly	reasoned	ideas	about	urban	and	rural	soundscapes,	there	is	an	even	more	compelling	observation	made	about	the	very	nature	of	his	understanding	of	sonic	experience.	In	the	2007	book	Autumn	Leaves,	Tim	Ingold	offers	a	phenomenological	critique	of	soundscape	without	detracting	from	its	initial	significance,	which	Ingold	emphasises:			 Undoubtedly	 when	 it	 was	 first	 introduced,	 the	 concept	 served	 a	 useful	rhetorical	purpose	in	drawing	attention	to	a	sensory	register	that	had	been	neglected	 relative	 to	 sight.	 I	 believe	 however	 that	 it	 has	 now	 outlived	 its	usefulness.	(Ingold	in	Carlyle,	2007,	p.	10)	
	Ingold’s	first	criticism	of	soundscape	is	one	that	I	have	already	noted	with	regard	to	recording	practices:	that	the	world	cannot	be	split	or	adequately	perceived	along	individual	sensory	lines	in	situ,	and	as	such,	only	a	recording	of	an	environment	can	render	it	a	mono-modal	sensory	experience.	This	is	of	particular	importance	when	considering	the	concept	of	the	soundscape.	In	drawing	our	attention	to	the	sonic	environment,	Schafer	asks	us	to	bracket	sound,	to	pay	attention	to	the	soundscape	as	independent	from	the	environment	as	a	totality.	While	Schafer	acknowledges	this,	stating	that	he	does	not	want	to	‘forget	that	that	the	ear	is	but	one	sense	receptor	among	many’	(1977,	p.	12),	nonetheless	he	effectively	disregards	other	senses	in	pursuit	of	raising	awareness	of	the	soundscape.	The	issue	here	is	that	although	Schafer	asks	us	to	consider	sound	alone,	he	also	asks	us	to	consider	sound	as	a	signifier	of	other	
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aspects	of	the	environment,	from	the	noisemakers	that	create	sound	waves,	to	the	social	and	cultural	weight	he	perceives	such	features	to	carry.	In	other	words,	Schafer	asks	us	to	reduce	our	experience	of	the	environment	to	that	of	sound	alone,	and	yet	he	wants	us	to	experience	the	environment	as	more	than	just	sound.	This	is	seen	most	clearly	in	his	delineation	of	soundscape	features:	soundmarks,	signals	and	keynotes.		Schafer’s	keynotes	are	‘sounds	of	a	landscape…created	by	its	geography	and	climate:	water,	wind,	forests,	plains,	birds,	insects,	and	animals.	Many	of	these	sounds	may	possess	archetypal	significance;	that	is,	they	may	have	imprinted	themselves	so	deeply	on	the	people	hearing	them	that	life	without	them	would	be	sensed	as	a	distinct	impoverishment’	(1977,	p.	9-10).	Additionally,	a	signal	‘must	be	listened	to	because	they	constitute	acoustic	warning	devices:	bells,	whistles,	horns	and	sirens’	(p.	10).	The	term	soundmark	‘is	derived	from	landmark	which	is	unique	or	possesses	qualities	which	make	it	specially	regarded	or	noticed	by	the	people	in	that	community’	(p.	10).	In	essence,	Schafer	is	not	so	much	concerned	with	sound	as	he	is	with	sources;	that	is,	machines,	people,	animals,	cities,	nature	etc.,	and	attitudes	towards	them.	This	approach	conceives	of	the	soundscape	as	a	collection	of	sound-making	objects.	This	raises	a	question:	given	Schafer’s	desire	is	to	evaluate	the	cultural	significance	of	these	sound-making	objects,	surely	enlisting	the	help	of	our	other	senses	would	only	add	greater	value	to	this	exercise.	In	other	words,	why	strip	objects	back	to	their	aural	attributes	if	the	aim	is	not	to	consider	them	in	purely	aural	terms?		As	touched	on	in	chapter	three,	Ingold	suggests	that	understanding	sound	as	source-bonded	promotes	the	misconception	of	sound-as-object.	Ingold	has	this	to	say	of	environmental	listening:			 Listening	 to	 our	 surroundings,	we	do	not	 hear	 a	 soundscape.	 For	 sound,	 I	would	 argue,	 is	 not	 the	 object	 but	 the	 medium	 of	 our	 perception…	soundscape	places	emphasis	on	the	surfaces	of	 the	world	 in	which	we	live.	Sound	and	light,	are	infusions	of	the	medium	in	which	we	find	our	being	and	through	which	we	move.	(Ingold,	2007,	p.11)	
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	With	an	understanding	of	environmental	sound	a	collection	of	source-bonded	objects,	the	Schaferian	soundscape	fails	to	account	for	the	spatial	and	temporal	complexity	of	sound	as	a	medium,	and	our	presence	within	it.	It	also	suggests	an	understanding	of	sonic	perception	that	instates	a	division	between	object	and	subject:	the	object	(the	soundscape)	exists	outside	the	body,	and	we	(the	subjects)	have	an	obligation	to	modify	it	for	the	better.	Objectification	of	the	sonic	environment,	as	Ingold	understands	it,	overlooks	the	‘fluxes	of	the	medium’	instead	conceiving	of	sound	as	‘already	precipitated	out,	or	solidified’	(2007,	p.	12),	thus	denying	it	its	temporal	and	spatial	dimensions,	dimensions	upon	which	our	perception	of	it	is	contingent.			Di	Scipio	has	this	to	say	of	sonic	objectification:		 This	 reductio	ad	objectum	–	 the	 objectification	 of	 sound	–	 consisted	 in	 the	forming	of	cognitive	processes	that	lead	us	to	usually	consider	all	sound	as	a	hard	object	that	can	be	moved	in	time	and	space,	that	does	not	belong	to	any	time	 and	 to	 any	 space,	 a	 reservoir	 (Bestand)	 that	 can	 be	 recalled	 and	represented	 independent	of	 the	 contingencies	of	 its	 coming	 into	presence.	(Di	Scipio,	2013)58		This	objectification	or	‘solidification’	of	sound	leads	to	an	assumption	that	attitudes	towards	it	can	be	collectivised.	Ingold	believes	that	where	visual	perception	is	concerned,	a	disregard	for	the	‘fluxes	of	the	medium’	–	in	this	instance,	light	–	has	resulted	in	a	similar	objectification.	In	support	of	this	notion,	Ihde	recounts,	‘Aristotle…	notes,	“Above	all	we	value	sight…	because	
sight	is	the	principle	source	of	all	knowledge	and	reveals	many	differences	between	one	object	and	another”’	(Ihde,	2007,	p.	7).	I	assert	that	the	solidification	of	sound,	as	promoted	by	soundscape	theory,	gives	it	the	assumed	truth-telling	capacity	Aristotle	accredits	visual	objects.	In	other	words,	in	the	“fixing	down”	of	the	soundscape,	itself	conceived	as	a	collection	of	source-bonded	objects,	soundscape	theorist	believe	they	are	able	to	determine	value																																																									
58 In the same address, Di Scipio suggests, as I do, that soundscape composers objectify soundscapes. Whereas I 
believe they do so as a result of attending to the source-bonded aspects of the environment, Di Scipio believes they 





	To	summarise	the	paradox	of	Schaferian	schizophonia:	it	denies	a	recording	the	power	to	capture	and	convey	any	source	context,	and	yet	recordings	of	soundscapes	by	the	World	Soundscape	Project	are	used	as	a	research	material	to	categorise	and	measure	what	amounts	to	contextual	information.	This	points	to	the	inherent	contradiction	of	schizophonia	–	it	conceives	of	documentary	and	abstraction	as	mutually	exclusive,	championing	abstraction	(albeit	in	a	negative	light)	yet	unable	to	shake	off	what	is	nonetheless	present,	the	trace	of	a	past	reality	in	the	recording.	Having	identified	this	contradiction,	the	question	that	must	be	asked	is	this:	how	much	information	–	beyond	sound	alone	–	do	the	promoters	of	schizophonia	believe	survives	the	recording	process	and	what	is	the	nature	of	this	information?	Does	a	soundscape	as	an	ecologically	framed	concept,	in	fact	survive	schizophonia,	a	notion	which	Westerkamp	appears	to	support?	In	order	to	dig	further	into	attitudes	towards	abstraction	and	documentary	in	soundscape	composition,	I	will	now	turn	to	the	ideas	of	Barry	Truax,	one	of	the	genre’s	most	prolific	composers	and	theorists.		In	Acoustic	Communication	(2001),	and	as	recounted	in	chapter	one,	Truax	refers	to	a	traditional	conception	of	the	phonograph	as	a	‘black	box’	and	the	linear	progression	of	materials	from	source	to	phonograph	to	listener	as	‘the	black	box	model	of	electroacoustics’:		 The	 “black	 box	 model	 of	 electroacoustic	 communication…	 completely	ignores	 the	 fact	 that	 the	context	of	 the	original	source	and	the	reproduced	signal	are	entirely	different.	The	concept	of	fidelity	puts	the	emphasis	on	the	quality	of	the	signal,	and	therefore	completely	ignores	the	fact	that	there	can	be	no	“fidelity”	 in	context	between	the	original	and	the	reproduced	sound.	(p.	11-12)		Such	a	statement	clearly	endorses	Schafer’s	schizophonia	concept,	promoting	the	basic	premise	that	recording	technology	is	unable	to	convey	contextual	information,	and	though	Truax	uses	less	emotive	language	than	Schafer,	both	composers	impart	the	strong	sense	that	the	source	of	a	sonic	environment	is	paramount,	and	that	recordings	of	these	fail	to	deliver	this	original	context	to	a	
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listener.	Truax	believes	it	is	then	the	responsibility	of	the	composer	to	reinstate	the	source	context	through	composition:		 Although	one	may	become	more	 intensely	 aware	of	 out-of-context	 sounds	simply	because	they	are	isolated	and	framed	by	technological	intervention,	the	 composer	 is	 left	with	 the	 problem	of	 how	 to	 reconstruct	 a	meaningful	utterance	with	them.	(2001,	p.	227)		Truax	proposes	that	although	the	act	of	framing	can	make	a	listener	‘more	aware	of	out-of-context	sounds’,	a	composer	must	‘reconstruct’	meaning.	However,	the	question	must	be	asked:	if	Truax	believes	that	he	can	reconstruct	meaning	through	composition,	how	can	this	happen	if	he	believes	the	materials	of	composition	are	inert;	that	is,	without	recourse	to	the	original	context?	Put	another	way,	how	can	the	use	of	montage,	granular	synthesis	(for	which	Truax	is	renown)	or	any	other	manipulation	or	arrangement	‘reconstruct’	meaning	from	materials	that	are	without	contextual	substance?	If	this	is	thought	to	be	the	case,	then	it	follows	that	Truax	could	reconstruct	the	source	context	of	an	environment	using	any	materials,	as	it	is	the	syntactical	arrangement	of	sound,	not	the	materials	themselves,	that	provide	a	listener	with	context.	This	is	demonstrably	not	the	case.	I	contend	that	Schafer,	Truax	and	the	practitioners	of	soundscape	composition	must	believe	that	an	environment’s	source	context	survives	the	recording	process,	refuting	the	logic	of	schizophonia.	Further	to	this,	Truax’	notion	that	meaning	can	be	reconstructed	through	composition	suggests	a	situation	whereby	a	composer	can	draw	context	from	the	materials,	as	if	the	process	of	recording	codifies	source	context,	and	the	composer	has	the	power	to	decode	and	present	it	through	studio-based	transformation.	This	understanding	of	the	nature	of	phonographic	abstraction	and	what	composition	can	achieve	is	not	logically	sound,	yet	it	is	a	core	principle	of	soundscape	composition.	Further	evidence	of	this	can	be	seen	when	examining	Truax’	description	of	what	defines	a	soundscape	work,	and	as	such	I	will	now	return	to	his	four-point	criteria	for	soundscape	composition:		 (1) Listener	recognisability	of	the	source	material	is	maintained,	even	if	it	subsequently	undergoes	transformation;	
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59 Nattiez’ chapter on electroacoustic music is entitled ‘The Status of the Sound Object’ (1990, p. 91-101) 
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between	the	phonograph	and	the	materials	comprising	the	work	at	a	temporal	level:	a	listener	is	understood	to	hear	both	the	past	event	and	the	new	phonographic	context.	This	indeed	proves	difficult	when	we	consider	the	esthetic	dimension	of	soundscape	composition,	as	I	will	soon	show,	but	still	there	is	a	striking	similarity	between	the	prescriptive	methodologies	of	both	musique	concrète	and	soundscape	composition	on	a	poietic	level.			Regarding	acousmatic	music,	Nattiez	reinstates	distance	between	the	poietic	and	the	neutral	levels	by	further	defining	the	poietic	dimension:			 By	 “poietic”	 I	 understand	 describing	 the	 link	 among	 the	 composer’s	intentions,	 his	 creative	 procedures,	 his	 mental	 schemas,	 and	 the	 result	 of	this	collection	of	strategies;	 that	 is	 the	components	that	go	 into	the	work’s	material	 embodiment.	 Poietic	 description	 thus	 also	 deals	 with	 a	 quite	special	 form	 of	 hearing	 (Varèse	 called	 it	 “the	 interior	 ear”):	 what	 the	composer	 hears	 while	 imagining	 the	 work’s	 sonorous	 result,	 or	 while	experimenting	at	the	piano,	or	with	tape.	(1990,	p.	92)	
	For	Nattiez,	the	poietic	dimension	of	acousmatic	music	is	not	simply	the	production	of	the	work	in	a	technical	sense,	but	one	that	reaches	into	the	intentionality	and	mental	methodology	of	production.	Understood	in	this	way,	the	poietics	of	musique	concrète	and	soundscape	composition	are	quite	similar;	both	utilise	field	recording,	studio	technology	and	‘mental	schemas’,	while	undoubtedly	applying	‘the	interior	ear’.	It	is	the	use	of	this	ear	that	truly	binds	musique	concrète	and	soundscape	composition	on	a	poietic	level.			Though	Schaeffer	attributes	‘reduced	listening’	to	the	role	of	the	‘receiver’	in	his	book	Traite	des	objets	musicaux	(1966),	that	is,	as	a	function	of	esthetic	appreciation,	Nattiez	believes	that	this	is	in	fact	a	poietic	process:		 I	 believe	 that	 Schaeffer’s	 “concentrated	 hearing”	 is,	 contrary	 to	 his	 own	implicit	claim,	essentially	poietical	in	that	it	is	in	fact	hearing	as	experienced	



















The	Ignorant	Schoolmaster		As	Rancière	recounts,	Joseph	Jacotot,	a	professor	of	French	literature	at	the	University	of	Louvain,	developed	ideas	around	the	transmission	of	knowledge	from	a	teacher	to	student	in	1818.	To	begin,	Rancière	notes	that	prior	to	this	time,	Jacotot	held	a	common	view	of	this	relationship:		 Like	 all	 conscientious	 professors,	 he	 knew	 that	 teaching	 was	 not	 in	 the	slightest	about	cramming	students	with	knowledge	and	having	them	repeat	it	 like	 parrots,	 but	 he	 knew	 equally	 well	 that	 students	 had	 to	 avoid	 the	chance	 detours	where	minds	 still	 incapable	 of	 distinguishing	 the	 essential	from	 the	 accessory,	 the	 principle	 from	 the	 consequence,	 get	 lost.	 In	 short,	the	essential	act	of	the	master	was	to	explicate…	(1991,	p.	3)		As	the	word	‘explicate’	suggests,	Jacotot	believed	that	the	role	of	the	teacher	was	to	reveal	knowledge,	while	providing	students	with	the	tools	to	learn:		 To	 teach	 was	 to	 transmit	 learning	 and	 form	 minds	 simultaneously,	 by	leading	 those	minds,	 according	 to	 an	 ordered	 progression,	 from	 the	most	simple	to	the	most	complex.	(p.	3)			It	might	be	argued	that	such	a	view	of	teaching	is	still	widely	held,	as	witnessed	in	the	structure	of	many	university	degrees.	However,	Jacotot’s	‘intellectual	adventure’,	as	Rancière	describes	it,	led	him	to	conclude	that	such	a	teaching	model	did	not	reflect	the	reality	of	explication	as	he	came	to	see	it.	Jacotot	believed	that	the	teacher	as	an	explicator	of	knowledge	was	in	fact	a	widely	held	misconception.	The	basis	for	this	argument	can	be	viewed	in	the	way	in	which	children	learn	language.	Rancière	notes	that	children	learn	language	at	a	very	young	age	without	explicit	instruction:		 We	speak	to	them	and	we	speak	around	them.	They	hear	and	retain,	imitate	and	repeat,	make	mistakes	and	correct	 themselves,	succeed	by	chance	and	begin	again	methodically,	and,	at	 too	young	an	age	for	explicators	to	begin	instructing	them,	they	are	almost	all	–	regardless	of	gender,	social	condition,	and	skin	color	–	able	to	understand	and	speak	the	language	of	their	parents.	
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And	 only	 now	 does	 this	 child	 who	 learned	 to	 speak	 through	 his	 own	intelligence	and	through	instructors	who	did	not	explain	language	to	him	–	only	 now	 does	 his	 instruction,	 properly	 speaking,	 begin.	 Now	 everything	happens	 as	 though	 he	 could	 no	 longer	 learn	 with	 the	 aid	 of	 the	 same	intelligence	 he	 has	 used	 up	 until	 now,	 as	 though	 the	 autonomous	relationship	between	apprenticeship	and	verification	were,	 from	this	point	on,	alien	to	him.	(p.	5-6)			From	this	Jacotot	developed	an	understanding	of	explication	that	was	contrary	to	how	it	was	generally	understood:	instruction	of	students	in	a	manner	that	promoted	a	false	division	of	intelligence,	that	of	a	superior	intelligence	held	by	the	teacher	and	of	inferior	intelligence	held	by	the	student,	produced	a	stultifying	effect.	As	Rancière	has	it,	this	insistence	on	a	gulf	between	the	teacher	and	the	student	‘is,	in	the	first	instance,	the	radical	difference	that	ordered,	progressive	teaching	teaches	the	pupil.	The	first	thing	it	teaches	her	is	her	own	inability.	In	its	activity,	it	thereby	constantly	confirms	its	own	presupposition:	the	inequality	of	intelligence.	This	endless	confirmation	is	what	Jacotot	calls	stultification’	(Rancière,	2009,	p.	9).	At	the	most	fundamental	level,	Jacotot	believed	in	an	equality	of	intelligence;	a	belief	that	all	humans	learn	in	the	same	way,	as	exemplified	in	the	way	that	children	learn	to	speak.		At	this	point,	it	might	be	asked	in	what	way	could	Jacotot’s	ideas	be	applied	to	the	works	of	soundscape	composition?		To	argue	that	soundscape	composers,	in	their	didactic	method	of	instruction,	instate	a	similar	gulf	of	intelligence	between	themselves	and	their	listeners	may	seem	crude.	However,	such	an	argument	is	not	entirely	unwarranted,	for	though	an	audience	is,	at	least	on	the	face	of	it,	asked	to	explore	acoustic	ecology	through	the	ephemeral	and	ethereal	experience	of	acousmatic	art	on	their	own	terms,	i.e.,	without	a	composer’s	explication,	in	my	view	it	is	not	the	art	through	which	instruction	is	truly	made:	it	is	through	the	words	of	the	composer,	spoken	or	printed,	that	their	beliefs	are	made	public,	and	through	these	words	that	listeners	orientate	themselves	in	relation	to	the	composer,	and	ultimately,	their	compositions.	Through	these	words,	a	composer	attempts	to	explicate,	the	success	of	which	I	will	question	shortly	with	regard	to	another	of	Rancière’s	texts,	The	Emancipated	Spectator	
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(2009).	I	would	first	like	to	consider	the	importance	of	this	contextual	information	(that	which	is	not	embedded	in	the	phonographic	work	itself)	or	as	Weale	(2005)	has	it,	the	work’s	dramaturgy,	to	soundscape	composition.	Though	granting	access	to	this	dramaturgical	information	is	not	an	explicit	part	of	soundscape	composition	methodology	as	described	by	Truax	–	at	no	point	does	Truax	insist	that	soundscape	compositions	must,	for	example,	all	have	titles,	and	be	accompanied	by	detailed	programme	notes	–	such	information	is	typically	included	in	the	presentation	of	works	and	used	as	an	orientating	device.	The	notes	to	Westerkamp’s	Beneath	the	Forest	Floor	(1992),	provide	such	an	example:		 Beneath	 the	 Forest	 Floor	 is	 attempting	 to	 provide	 a	 space	 in	 time	 for	 the	experience	of	such	peace.	Better	still,	it	hopes	to	encourage	listeners	to	visit	a	 place	 like	 the	 Carmanah,	 half	 of	 which	 has	 already	 been	 destroyed	 by	clear-cut	logging.	Aside	from	experiencing	its	huge	stillness	a	visit	will	also	transmit	a	very	real	knowledge	of	what	is	lost	if	these	forests	disappear:	not	only	 the	 trees	but	 also	 an	 inner	 space	 that	 they	 transmit	 to	us:	 a	 sense	of	balance	and	focus,	of	new	energy	and	life.	The	inner	forest,	the	forest	in	us.60		I	argue	that	this	information	is	in	fact	the	only	way	in	which	a	composer	can	communicate	with	a	listener	about	their	concerns,	as	the	composition	alone,	stripped	of	this	dramaturgical	information,	does	not	hold	the	power	to	transmit	the	intentions	of	a	composer	to	a	listener.			As	mentioned,	Robert	Weale	refers	to	this	kind	of	accessory	information	as	belonging	to	a	composition’s	dramaturgy,	as	describes	in	his	PhD	thesis,	The	
Intention/Reception	Project:	Investigating	the	relationship	between	composer	
intention	and	listener	response	in	Electroacoustic	Compositions	(2005).	Weale’s	methodology	is	as	follows:		 The	Intention/Reception	project's	methodology,	 the	development	of	which	is	discussed	in	detail	in	this	thesis,	involves	introducing	RWE/A	[real	world	electroacoustic]	works	that	are	unknown	to	the	listening	subjects,	and	then																																																									
60 For full program notes for Beneath the Forest Floor (1992) See 
http://www.sfu.ca/~westerka/program_notes/forestfloor.html (assessed 21 October 2014) 
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evaluating	 their	 listening	 experience.	 Through	 repeated	 listening	 and	 the	introduction	of	the	composers'	articulation	of	intent	(through	a	work's	title,	inspiration,	 elements	 that	 the	 composer	 intends	 to	 be	 communicated,	eventually	 elements	 of	 the	 compositional	 process	 itself	 –	 in	 short,	 the	‘dramaturgy’	of	 the	work)	 listening	responses	are	monitored.	The	purpose	here	 is	 to	 investigate	 to	what	 extent	 familiarity	 contributes	 to	 access	 and	appreciation	and	to	what	extent	intention	and	reception	are	meeting	in	this	very	particular	corpus	of	E/A	art	music.	(2005,	p.	2)		Weale	positions	his	research	within	the	context	of	similar	studies,	most	notably	Leigh	Landy’s.	As	Weale	recounts,	Landy’s	initial	inquiry	into	the	relationship	between	intention	and	reception	was	born	of	a	desire	to	increase	the	audience	for	electroacoustic	music.	Landy’s	paper	at	the	1990	International	Computer	Music	Conference,	“Is	more	than	three	decades	of	computer	music	reaching	the	public	it	deserves?”(Landy,	1990,	p.	369),	concluded	that	‘E/A	[electroacoustic]	art	music	could	and	should	access	an	audience	outside	of	that	which	it	generally	accessed,	and	that	based	on	this	premise	E/A	art	music	research	and	artists’	endeavour	should	devote	a	certain	degree	of	its	investigative	energy	towards	addressing	this	issue’	(2005,	p.	21).	Weale’s	study	is	located	within	this	context,	insofar	as	he	attempted	to	determine	the	kinds	of	conditions	under	which	a	positive	connection	can	be	made	between	what	a	composer	intends,	and	what	a	listener	receives.	Weale	holds,	as	Landy	does,	that	there	could	be	a	greater	audience	for	electroacoustic	music	than	it	has,	with	the	theory	that	‘by	being	offered	something	to	hold	on	to	(e.g.,	dramaturgic	information)	inexperienced	listeners	will	be	more	able	to	access	and	appreciate	a	work	and	so	have	an	engaging	and	enjoyable	listening	experience’	(2005,	p.	15).		The	details	of	Weale’s	testing	procedure,	including	the	selection	of	composers	and	test	subjects,	the	design	of	questionnaires	for	both	composers	and	participants,	and	the	structure	of	the	test	procedure	can	be	summarised	as	follows.	Participants	were	played	three	compositions	three	times,	with	response	assessments	completed	between	each	presentation.	At	first,	the	participants	were	played	each	of	the	three	compositions	without	any	dramaturgical	information,	and	asked	for	their	responses.	They	were	then	given	the	titles	of	
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Ignorant	Schoolmaster,	chiefly,	intellectual	emancipation,	and	examines	the	role	of	the	spectator	in	this	context.	Rancière	dedicates	a	chapter	of	his	book	to	what	he	terms	‘the	intolerable	image’,	and	though	many	of	his	other	ideas	find	commonality	with	phonography	more	generally	(see	chapter	six),	it	is	this	particular	chapter	that	reveals	the	most	where	soundscape	composition	is	concerned.	To	claim	that	soundscape	composition	shares	features	with	images	such	as	those	of	Martha	Rosler’s	‘Bringing	the	War	Home:	House	Beautiful’	(1967-1972),	requires	some	explanation.	Rosler’s	images	are	what	Rancière	describes	as	intolerable.	They	consist	of	montaged	photographs	of	luxurious	New	York	apartment	interiors,	with	gruesome	images	of	the	Vietnam	War.	Perhaps	the	most	famous	of	these	depicts	a	Vietnamese	man	standing	in	front	of	a	large	open-plan	living	room	with	a	dead	child	in	his	arms:		 The	 image	 of	 the	 dead	 child	was	 supposed	 to	 tear	 apart	 the	 image	 of	 the	artificial	happiness	of	American	existence;	it	was	supposed	to	open	the	eyes	
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of	those	who	enjoy	this	happiness	to	the	intolerability	of	that	reality	and	to	their	own	complicity,	in	order	to	engage	them	in	the	struggle.	(2009,	p.	84)					It	might	seem	inappropriate	to	compare	the	horrors	of	war	with	the	concerns	of	acoustic	ecology,	however	it	is	important	to	remember	that	it	is	the	language	of	acoustic	ecologists	and	soundscape	composers	themselves	that	give	this	comparison	some	credence.	Schafer	reminds	us	that	with	schizophonia,	‘sounds	are	torn	from	their	natural	sockets’	(Schafer,	1977,	p.	90),	describing	the	act	of	recording	in	acutely	violent	terms.	Likewise,	in	Kits	Beach	Soundwalk	(1989)	Westerkamp	likens	the	gentle	city	hum	to	a	monster:	‘play	with	the	monster,	then	I	can	face	the	monster,’	she	recites	as	the	city	reasserts	itself	at	the	end	of	her	piece.		Though	in	more	recent	years	soundscape	composers	have	been	actively	trying	to	build	a	more	positive,	celebratory	notion	of	how	the	soundscape	should	be	promoted,	a	tenacious	idea	persists:	in	order	to	raise	awareness	surrounding	acoustic	ecology,	particularly	noise	abatement,	noise,	be	it	the	city	hum	or	a	product	of	schizophonia,	needs	to	be	portrayed	in	a	negative	light,	as	seen	in	Kits	Beach	Soundwalk,	in	order	to	make	the	point	explicit.61	Soundscape	composition	of	this	order	designates	noise	as	‘intolerable’,	and	uses	techniques	that	bear	comparison	to	Rosler’s	in	order	to	make	the	point.		Using	Kits	Beach	Soundwalk	as	an	example,	Westerkamp	accentuates	the	intolerable	city	hum	by	accentuating	it	through	the	loudspeakers;	the	very	medium	that	facilitates	schizophonia,	which,	perhaps	inadvertently,	draws	attention	to	our	complicity	as	consumers	of	audio	technology	in	the	increase	of	the	global	noise-floor.	Just	as	Westerkamp	‘plays	with	the	monster’	between	the	loudspeakers,	so	does	Rosler,	playing	with	her	monsters	here	on	the	stairwell	or	there	outside	the	window	of	the	luxurious	apartment.	Rancière	notes:		 The	view	of	the	dead	child	in	the	beautiful	apartment,	with	its	bright	walls	and	 vast	 proportions,	 is	 certainly	 difficult	 to	 tolerate.	 But	 there	 is	 no	particular	 reason	 why	 it	 should	 make	 those	 who	 see	 it	 conscious	 of	 the	reality	of	imperialism	and	desirous	of	opposing	it…	for	the	image	to	produce																																																									
61 In ‘Acoustic Ecology of Great Places’ (2014), John Drever asserts that acoustic ecology is developing a more 
positive ear towards the soundscape. http://www.academyofurbanism.org.uk/acoustic-ecology-of-great-places/ 
Accessed 27/11/2014 
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its	 political	 effect,	 the	 spectator	 must	 already	 be	 convinced	 that	 what	 it	shows	 is	 American	 imperialism,	 not	 the	 madness	 of	 human	 beings	 in	general.	She	must	also	be	convinced	 that	she	 is	herself	guilty	of	sharing	 in	the	prosperity	rooted	in	imperialist	exploitation	of	the	world.	And	she	must	further	feel	guilty	about	being	there	and	doing	nothing;	about	viewing	these	images	 of	 pain	 and	 death,	 rather	 than	 struggling	 against	 the	 powers	responsible	 for	 it.	 In	 short,	 she	must	 already	 feel	 guilty	 about	 viewing	 the	image	that	is	to	create	the	feeling	of	guilt.	(2009,	p.	85)		In	much	the	same	way,	soundscape	composers	attempt	to	raise	awareness	about	the	increasing	global	noise-floor,	the	endangerment	of	certain	soundscapes	and	the	struggle	to	preserve	them.	However,	their	works	fail	to	raise	awareness,	to	inflict	a	sense	of	guilt	or	to	shock	a	listener	into	action,	as	in	order	to	deduce	a	political	message	from	soundscape	composition,	a	listener	must	already	be	convinced	of	the	work’s	politics.	By	way	of	example,	in	order	to	understand	Westerkamp’s	city	hum	as	monstrous,	a	listener	must	already	believe	the	city	hum	to	be	a	negative	environmental	feature,	and	be	closed	to	its	aesthetic	interest.	In	addition,	listeners	must	also	be	aware	of	their	complicity	in	the	production	of	noise.	In	short,	soundscape	composers	do	not	achieve	their	desire	to	raise	awareness	of	acoustic	ecology	through	composition,	as	those	listeners	who	successfully	generate	the	intended	meaning	from	the	work,	are	already	orientated	within	acoustic	ecology.			This	observation	is	related	to	my	belief	that	the	sonic	environment	does	not	carry	any	inherent	meaning.	Much	like	Fisher	(1998),	I	understand	the	sonic	environment	as	a	phenomenon	that	lacks	the	appropriate	features	to	afford	a	collective	aesthetic	response	to	it,62	and	as	such,	an	environment’s	‘deeper	meaning’	can	only	be	understood	as	what	an	individual	composer	has	it	to	mean.	I	also	contend	that	soundscape	composers	cannot	impart	their	intentionality	through	composition	alone.	Dramaturgical	information	must	be	used	in	order	to	orientate	the	listener	to	the	composer’s	‘interior	ear’,	and	without	this	information,	a	listener	is	left	with	no	way	of	knowing	what	a	composition	may																																																									
62 While I believe some societies, such as the Kaluli of Papua New Guinea (Feld ,1994), may exhibit a heightened 
and perhaps more communal appreciation of the sonic environment, I do not believe that sonic environments can 




















63 Husserl’s adumbrations, in phenomenological terms, are understood as limited aspects of the noema, inferred 
through hyletic data. In this way, the phonograph might be understood as an adumbration of the nominalist work. 
See chapter four for my analysis of the adumbration within the context of sound, and Philipse, (1995, p. 239-323) 







Vision:	Sound	on	Screen	(1994),	Michel	Chion	explores	the	inter-relatedness	of	the	aural	and	visual	senses	in	film,	with	a	core	feature	being	how	each	‘adds	value’	to	the	other.	He	writes:		 Visual	 and	 auditory	 perception	 are	 of	 much	more	 disparate	 natures	 than	one	might	 think.	 The	 reason	we	are	 only	dimly	 aware	 of	 this	 is	 that	 these	
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two	perceptions	mutually	 influence	each	other	 in	 the	audiovisual	contract,	lending	 each	 other	 their	 respective	 properties	 by	 contamination	 and	projection.	(1994,	p.	9)	Chion	illuminates	some	interesting	features	of	aural	and	visual	perception	in	the	course	of	his	discussion.	Concerning	motion	and	stasis,	Chion	notes	that	‘sound,	contrary	to	sight,	presupposes	movement	from	the	outset’	(1994,	p.	9).	Though	sound	may	offer	stasis	in	the	form	of	steady-state	sound	wave	propagation,	such	as	the	sound	of	a	generator	or,	as	Chion	offers,	a	telephone’s	dial	tone,	‘it	is	rare	not	to	hear	at	least	some	trace	of	irregularity	and	motion’	(p.	9).	This	first	point	shows	how	sound	is	contingent	upon	motion	of	some	description,	while	film	may	be	static,	moving,	or	a	mixture,	and	with	various	states	in	between.	Chion	also	intimates	that	humans	can	detect	very	subtle	changes	in	sound,	a	point	he	expands	on	by	stating	that	there	is	a	disparity	between	the	rate	of	perception	of	the	visual	and	aural	senses,	claiming	aural	perception	is	much	faster	at	processing	information	than	visual	perception:	
Sound	 perception	 and	 visual	 perception	 have	 their	 own	 average	 pace	 by	their	 very	 nature;	 basically,	 the	 ear	 analyzes,	 processes,	 and	 synthesizes	faster	than	the	eye.	(1994,	p.	10)	Arthur	R.	Jensen’s	research,	in	Clocking	the	Mind:	Mental	Chronometry	and	
Individual	Differences	(2006),	supports	Chion’s	assertion,	noting	that	‘the	fastest	visual	and	auditory	SRTs	[Simple	Reaction	Times]	are	about	180	and	140ms	respectively’	(p.	47).64	Further	to	this,	Chion	also	posits	that	
The	eye	perceives	more	slowly	because	it	has	more	to	do	all	at	once;	it	must	explore	in	space	as	well	as	follow	along	in	time.	The	ear	isolates	a	detail	of	its	 auditory	 field	and	 it	 follows	 this	point	or	 line	 in	 time…	so,	overall,	 in	 a	first	 contact	with	 an	 audiovisual	message,	 the	 eye	 is	more	 spatially	 adept,	and	the	ear	more	temporally	adept.	(1994,	p.	11)	This	particular	notion	appears	as	the	tenth	point	on	Sterne’s	list	of	audiovisual	litanies:	‘hearing	is	a	primarily	temporal	sense,	vision	is	a	primarily	spatial																																																									
64 Jensen also notes that the reaction time to touch is about 150ms, and that reaction times to taste and smell are 
hard to measure, but they are ‘relatively slow and imprecise’ by comparison (2006, p. 47). Given the 40ms 
difference in reaction time between aural and visual perception, Jensen concludes that ‘transduction of a visual 
stimulus takes longer, presumably because it involves a chemical process in the retina, whereas audition involves a 
quicker, mechanical action’ (p. 47). 
	 	 182	
sense’	(2003,	p.	15).	Though	designated	as	a	litany,	it	should	be	noted	that	Sterne	does	little	to	discredit	the	validity	of	such	an	observation	beyond	questioning	its	social	and	historical	origins.		Though	it	might	be	argued	that	hearing	and	vision	are	not	primarily	temporal	and	spatial	senses	respectively;	that	is,	each	sense	contributes	to	temporal	and	spatial	awareness	to	some	degree,	the	contribution	of	aural	perception	to	temporal	awareness	should	not	be	understated.	Chion’s	assertion	finds	support	in	the	writing	of	acoustician	Jian	Kang,	who	notes	that	‘sound	provides	dynamism	and	a	sense	of	reality,	helping	people	to	get	the	sense	of	the	progression	of	time’	(Kang,	2007,	p.		48).	This	observation	reveals	a	direct	link	between	the	perception	of	temporal	progression	and	a	‘sense	of	reality’,	a	point	that	Chion	pursues	further	in	his	analysis	of	temporality.	Highlighting	the	temporal	adeptness	of	the	ear	is	of	particular	value	to	the	discussion	of	the	phonograph’s	ontology.	Chion	describes	the	‘three	aspects	of	temporalisation’	in	the	audiovisual	contract:	temporal	animation,	temporal	linearisation,	and	temporal	vectorisation.	Of	temporal	animation,	Chion	states	that	‘to	varying	degrees,	sound	renders	the	perception	of	time	in	the	image	as	exact,	detailed,	immediate,	concrete…’	(1994,	p.	13).	Where	a	largely	static	image	is	concerned,	sound	may	provide	an	image	with	a	sense	of	time	passing	which	may	be	otherwise	difficult	to	detect,	such	as	an	interior	shot	of	a	room	filled	with	inanimate	objects.	Where	an	image	is	animated,	perhaps	with	a	mixture	of	moving	and	static	objects,	sound	enforces	a	sense	of	real-time	progression,	adding	micro-detail	and	spatial	information.	In	other	words,	it	is	the	aural	dimension	that	renders	temporality	in	film	exact.	
Temporal linearisation describes the way in which sound provides images with 
sequential linearity:		
When	a	sequence	of	images	does	not	necessarily	show	temporal	succession	in	 the	 actions	 it	 depicts	 –	 that	 is,	 when	 we	 can	 read	 them	 equally	 as	simultaneous	 or	 successive	 –	 the	 addition	 of	 realistic,	 diegetic	 sound	imposes	 on	 the	 sequence	 a	 sense	 of	 real	 time,	 like	 normal	 everyday	experience,	 and	 above	 all,	 a	 sense	 of	 time	 that	 is	 linear	 and	 sequential.	(1994,	p.	17-18)	
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This	feature	shows	just	how	compelling	aural	perception	is	regarding	a	listener’s	perspective	of	time.	An	image	may	jump	from	one	scene	to	another,	to	the	extent	that,	if	viewed	without	sound,	they	may	be	identified	as	unrelated.	Sound,	however,	ties	potentially	unrelated	images	together.	We	cannot	say	that	the	reverse	is	true:	a	continuous	camera	shot	will	not	homogenise	disparate	audio	into	a	temporally	believable	sequence.	For	this	reason,	it	is	sound	which	has	the	truth-telling	capacity	often	attributed	to	sight	(“seeing	is	believing”);	as	Chion	states	above,	aurality	is	the	dominant	sensorial	field	in	the	perception	of	real-time,	linear	progression.		Temporal	vectorisation	is	another	feature	of	the	audiovisual	contract	that	emphasises	the	role	of	aurality	in	temporal	awareness	in	film.	Chion	provides	an	excellent	example:	
Imagine	 a	 peaceful	 shot	 in	 a	 film	 set	 in	 the	 tropics,	 where	 a	 woman	 is	ensconced	 in	 a	 rocking	 chair	 on	 a	 veranda,	 dozing,	 her	 chest	 rising	 and	falling	regularly.	The	breeze	stirs	the	curtains	and	the	bamboo	wind	chimes	that	hang	by	the	doorway.	The	leaves	of	the	banana	trees	flutter	in	the	wind.	We	could	take	this	poetic	shot	and	easily	project	it	from	the	last	frame	to	the	first,	 and	 this	 would	 change	 essentially	 nothing,	 it	 would	 all	 look	 just	 as	natural.	(1994,	p.	18-19)	Where	temporal	progress	is	visually	fungible	it	is	not	so	sonically.	Sound,	in	this	instance	provides	us	with	the	only	indication	of	the	‘correct’	progression	of	time.	If	we	were	to	play	the	synchronous	audio	of	this	hypothetical	scene	backwards,	last	sample	to	first,	we	would	encounter	the	unmistakable	signatures	of	reversed	audio,	with	sound’s	decay	profiles	leading	attack	transients	and	spatial	information,	such	as	a	sound’s	reflection,	preceding	their	stimulus.	Chion	concedes	that	in	many	instances	the	same	signatures	may	be	perceived	in	reversed	moving	images,	pointing	to	‘inevitable	gags’	such	as	the	reversal	of	exploding	objects.	However,	he	notes:	
But much more frequently in movies, images of a character who speaks, smiles, 
plays the piano, or whatever are reversible; they are not marked with a sense of 
past and future. Sound, on the other hand, quite often consists of a marking off 
of small phenomena oriented in time. Isn't piano music, for example, composed 
of thousands of little indices of vectorized real time, since each note begins to 
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die as soon as it is born? (1994, p. 20) Chion’s	analysis	of	audiovisual	temporality	leads	us	to	two	important	conclusions	regarding	the	nature	of	sound.	The	first	of	which	is	that	sound	enforces	a	sense	of	
the	present	with	some	authority.	This	is	aided	by	sound’s	vectorisation	of	time,	whereby	the	attack	and	decay	of	Chion’s	piano	for	example,	indexes	time,	providing	a	sense	of	the	present	and	the	passing	of	time.	As	Chion	concludes,	when	real-world	experiences	are	mediatised,	this	feature	of	auditory	perception	remains	intact	and	is	exploited	in	film,	in	order	to	provide	the	film	with	a	sense	of	‘the	present’	that	mediatised	visuality	no	longer	carries	with	the	same	conviction.	This	is	not	to	say	that	film	cannot	vectorise	and	therefore	index	time;	indeed	vectorisation	is	contingent	upon	the	perception	of	movement,	movement	that	can	also	be	detected	in	the	moving	image.	In	Cinema	1:	the	Movement	Image	(1986),	Deleuze	argues	that		








temporal	span	or	duration	of	sounding	that	is	experienced	in	listening.	I	do	not	hear	one	instant	followed	by	another;	I	hear	an	enduring	gestalt	within	which	 the	modulations	 of	 the	melody,	 the	 noises	 present	 themselves.	 The	instant	as	an	atom	of	time	is	an	abstraction	which	is	related	to	the	illusion	of	a	 thing	 in	 itself.	 In	 terms	 of	 a	 perceptual	 field	we	 have	 noted	 that	 a	 thing	always	occurs	as	situated	within	a	larger	unity	of	a	field;	so	temporally	the	use	of	instant	here	is	perceived	to	occur	only	within	the	larger	duration	of	a	temporal	span,	a	living	present.	(2007,	p.	89)	In	suggesting	that	we	encounter	a	temporal	span	when	listening	suggests	that	listening	and	temporal	awareness	are	intrinsically	related.	Ihde	makes	this	point	clear:	
When	 I	 listen	 to	auditory	events,	 there	seems	 to	be	no	way	 in	which	 I	 can	escape	the	sense	of	a	“coming	into	being”	and	a	“passing	from	being”	in	the	modulated	 motions	 of	 sound.	 Here	 temporality	 is	 not	 a	 matter	 of	“subjectivity”	 but	 a	matter	 of	 the	way	 the	 phenomenon	 presents	 itself	 (p.	94).	Husserl	refers	to	this	“coming	into	being”	and	“passing	from	being”	as	protentions	and	retentions	respectively,	and	that	the	time	between	the	onset	of	the	
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protentions	and	the	conclusion	of	retentions	represents	the	field	within	which	our	aural	perception	operates.	Ihde	uses	the	term	temporal	focus	to	describe	our	attentional	intentionality	(p.	90).	In	Ihde’s	view,	and	as	the	term	suggests,	this	temporal	focus	has	the	ability	to	traverse	the	temporal	span,	and	with	an	attentional	depth,	understood	as	an	ability	to	bring	certain	auditory	data	to	the	foreground	of	our	intentionality,	while	relegating	others	to	the	background.	This	attentional	depth	may	have	a	broad	or	narrow	focus	depending	on	the	intentionality	of	the	listener.	Of	this	attentional	depth,	Ihde	suggests	that	a	broader	focus	may	be	employed	while	listening	to	relaxing	instrumental	music.	In	this	instance,	an	individual’s	attention	maybe	less	concerned	with	a	foreground	and	background,	and	may	be	termed	‘panoramic’	(p.	90).	The	ability	to	‘pull’	aural	data	to	the	foreground	is	often	acknowledged	by	various	researchers	in	different	fields.	Within	the	context	of	information	theory,	Truax	notes	our	ability	to	tune-out	the	repetitive,	redundant	sounds	found	in	urban	environments	in	order	to	focus	pertinent	information	(2001,	p.	19),	while	Bregman	recounts	his	own	version	of	Colin	Cherry’s	‘cocktail	party	effect’,	in	which	he	displays	an	ability	to	determine	the	timbre	of	a	friend’s	voice	despite	the	competing	frequencies	of	the	clinking	glassware	at	the	party	(1990,	p.	2).	Ihde’s	analysis	of	this	narrow	perceptual	focus	includes	a	compelling	account	of	the	way	in	which	it	operates	within	the	temporal	span:	
If	I	am	to	be	the	subject	of	a	psychological	experiment	in	which	a	click	is	to	be	 the	 signal	 of	 some	 action,	 I	 listen	 intently	 for	 that	 short	 and	 barely	enduring	sound.	My	protending	expectation	“searches”	the	futural	“edge”	of	the	temporal	span	in	order	to	be	prepared	for	the	onset	of	the	click.	I	have	“pushed”	 all	 other	 auditory-temporal	 factors	 into	 the	 background	 and	 I	listen	only	for	the	click.	(2007,	p.	93)	While	it	might	seem	likely	that	attentional	intentionality	will	always	focus	our	perception	to	this	futural	edge	as	we	search	out	specific	data,	Ihde	presents	another	hypothetical	experiment	that	displays	the	way	in	which	we	have	the	ability	to	shift	focus	away	from	this	edge:	
I	am	now	to	listen	to	a	tone	to	identify	its	position	in	the	musical	scale.	Again	I	 listen	 intently	 with	 the	 same	 selectivity	 for	 the	 tone.	 This	 time	 at	 its	presence	 I	do	not	attend	specifically	 to	 its	 instantaneous	source-point,	but	
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pay	special	attention	to	its	tonal	quality,	which	appears	even	more	strongly	in	its	“running	off”	reverberation,	and	I	identify	it	as	middle	C.	(2007,	p.	93)	Here,	Ihde’s	focus	is	aimed	at	the	“running	off”	of	the	temporal	span,	though	he	listens	just	as	intently	as	he	did	for	the	click	in	the	previous	example.	He	also	notes	that	while	temporal	focus	is	often	aimed	at	the	futural	edge	(protentions)	or	the	“running	off”	(retentions)	of	the	temporal	span,	a	broader	focus	may	be	employed.	Again,	Ihde	uses	the	example	of	musical	listening	to	illustrate	a	broader	temporal	focus,	this	time	of	the	temporal	dimension,	by	suggesting	that	‘one	usually	allows	the	full	richness	of	the	musical	presence	to	occur	in	what	is	here	a	broad	or	open	focus	with	the	onset	of	each	note	enriched	by	the	depth	of	those	that	have	just	preceded	it	“equally”	present.’	(2007,	p.	94)	Ihde’s	appraisal	of	the	temporal	span	and	temporal	focus	tells	us	a	great	deal	about	the	perception	of	time	in	aural	experience,	augmenting	Chion’s	account	of	the	realness	of	temporal	progression	with	a	phenomenological	account	of	how	temporality	is	manifested	in	aural	perception.	He	also	notes	how	moving	phenomena	specifically	(spatial	movement	in	particular),	including	sound,	hold	a	privileged,	direct	relationship	with	the	perception	of	time.	As	mentioned,	movement	in	visual	perception	can	also	index	time,	as	Deleuze	(1986)	would	argue,	though	when	we	recall	Chion’s	observation	that	‘sound,	contrary	to	sight,	presupposes	movement	from	the	outset’	(1994,	p.	9),	we	might	conclude	that	aural	perception	is	the	more	privileged	of	the	two	senses	in	this	regard.	Ihde	supports	this	notion	with	the	following	analogy:	
If	 I	 look	at	 the	calendar	on	 the	wall,	 it	 stands	out	as	motionless	and	mute,	and	in	relation	to	it	I	detect	only	a	massive	newness.	Its	appearance	neither	dramatically	comes	into	presence	nor	passes	from	it	in	its	motionless	state.	If	I	want	to	take	note	of	its	“temporality”	I	must	already	make	a	reflective	turn	to	noetic	 phenomena:	 it	 is	my	consciousness	 that	 is	aware	 of	 the	passing	of	








The	on-rushing	train	did	not	simply	produce	the	negative	experience	of	fear	but	 the	 particularly	 modern	 entertainment	 form	 of	 the	 thrill,	 embodied	elsewhere	 in	 the	 recently	 appearing	 attractions	 of	 the	 amusement	 parks	(such	as	the	roller	coaster),	which	combined	sensations	of	acceleration	and	falling	 with	 a	 security	 guaranteed	 by	 modern	 industrial	 technology.	(Gunning	in	Loiperdinger,	2004,	p.	104)	Gunning’s	assessment	might	be	more	broadly	contextualised	within	what	Coleridge	famously	described	as	a	‘willing	suspension	of	disbelief’,	in	which	an	audience	puts	aside	their	understanding	of	fiction	in	order	to	enjoy	the	content	as	
if	it	were	real,	as	a	matter	of	‘poetic	faith’.65	The	nature	of	this	suspension	has	been	the	subject	of	some	debate	which	I	cannot	enter	into	here,	but	applied	to	
L'arrivée	d'un	train	en	gare	de	La	Ciotat,	we	might	conclude	without	much	difficulty	that	audiences,	from	the	safety	of	their	seats,	enjoyed	the	thrill	of	seeing	a	train	approaching,	giving	themselves	over	to	the	fantasy	that	it	might	breach	the																																																									
65 Samuel Taylor Coleridge first used the term in his Biographia Literaria (1817), Chapter XIV, regarding his 
works of poetry, and how he believed his ‘supernatural’ content should be understood by his readers. 
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fourth	wall	of	the	cinema	screen,	without	actually	fearing	for	their	lives.	As	such,	though	2D	moving	images	project	a	sense	of	3D	space	behind	the	screen,	they	do	not	project	into	the	theatre	in	the	way	promoted	by	the	panic	story	(or	‘myth’,	as	Loiperdinger	has	it)	of	L'arrivée	d'un	train	en	gare	de	La	Ciotat.		It	is	worth	considering	the	difference	between	the	cinematic	capture	of	this	train,	and	a	hypothetical	audio	recording	of	it	(a	comparison	with	historical	valence,	given	the	key	role	of	train	recordings	in	Schaeffer’s	early	work).	At	a	very	basic	level,	the	two	are	similar:	they	are	abstracted	from	reality	via	their	respective	mediatisation,	and	are	in	no	way	‘real’	trains.	However,	audio	recordings	offer	a	sense	of	the	real	that	visual	recordings	do	not,	beyond	the	phenomenological	discussion	of	temporality	addressed	in	the	preceding	section,	and	this	is	related	to	their	method	of	playback.		The	cinema	screen	positions	the	abstracted	reality	of	the	train	at	a	specific	location,	usually	in	front	of	the	viewer	at	some	distance.	There	is	a	distinction	between	the	screen	and	the	materials	projected	on	it,	and	the	space	of	the	room,	where	a	spectator	sits	remotely	from	the	images.	It	is	this	remove	that	allows	the	spectator	to	easily	distinguish	between	the	action	on	the	screen,	and	their	present	reality.	However,	audio	playback	blurs	this	distinction.	It	does	this	by	utilising	the	architecture	of	the	room	of	audition.	Though	the	speaker(s)	may	also	be	placed	in	front	of	the	spectator	just	as	the	screen	is,	the	sound	of	the	room	becomes	more	pronounced	the	louder	the	amplification,	emphasising	the	space	of	audition,	thus	wedding	the	sonic	aspects	of	the	past	reality	with	the	new	reality	of	the	theatre.66	As	such,	as	the	train	approaches	the	camera,	the	room	becomes	sonically	enlivened	by	it,	at	once	announcing	the	presence	of	the	room,	and	the	sound	of	a	train	within	it.	In	contrast	to	this	assertion,	Michal	Chion	suggests	that:	
New	 movie	 houses	 whose	 acoustics	 are	 conceived	 or	 overhauled	 with	luxury	sound	projection	in	mind	have	indeed	mercilessly	vanquished	reverb	through	 the	 choice	 of	 building	 materials	 and	 architectural	 planning.	 The	result	 is	 that	 the	 sound	 feels	 very	 present	 and	 very	 neutral,	 but	 suddenly	one	no	longer	has	the	feeling	of	the	real	dimensions	of	the	room,	no	matter	how	big	it	is.	(1994,	p.	100)																																																									
66 Blesser and Salter (2007) address the role of architecture in aural experience. This notion sits within the basic 
premise of their thesis. 
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Though	Chion	attests	to	the	presence	of	sound	in	the	modern	movie	theatre,	he	believes	that	the	presence	of	the	room	has	been	muted.	This	may	indeed	be	the	aim	of	modern	theatre	design,	but	I	argue	that	to	say	‘one	no	longer	has	the	feeling	of	the	real	dimensions	of	the	room’	fails	to	account	for	the	complexity	of	acoustic	experience	in	such	conditions.	Chion’s	conclusion	conceives	of	a	room’s	acoustic	profile	as	simply	a	matter	of	reverberation,	and	when	such	reverberation	is	removed,	the	theatre	no	longer	“speaks”.	In	fact,	movie	theatres	have	a	very	specific	acoustic	profile,	a	profile	that	is	becoming	increasingly	common	due	to	the	adherence	of	many	theatres	to	industry	standards,67	and	as	such,	not	only	do	theatres	“speak”,	but	they	speak	with	an	increasingly	standardised	voice.		To	further	argue	his	point,	Chion	recounts	the	sound	demonstrations	typically	found	before	the	start	of	movies	at	industry-regulated	movie	theatres.	Of	the	THX	demonstration,	Chion	suggests:	
We	 may	 note	 two	 characteristics	 of	 this	 sound	 demo	 that	 typify	 current	taste.	 First,	 the	 bass	 sound	 that	 the	 glissando	 ends	 on	 is	 clean	 of	 all	distortion	 and	 secondary	 vibrations,	 even	 though	 very	 low	 sounds	 in	 the	real	 world	 have	 the	 necessary	 consequence	 of	 causing	 small	 objects	 to	vibrate	–	for	example,	a	passing	semi	truck	sets	the	furniture	or	the	dishes	to	shaking.	What	the	demo	short	is	doing	to	stir	the	audience's	admiration,	far	from	any	idea	of	fidelity,	 is	showing	off	the	technical	capacity	to	isolate	and	purify	the	sound	ingredients.	Second,	one	finds	no	trace	in	the	demo	of	the	 reverberation	 that	normally	accompanies	and	muddles	 loud	 sounds	 in	an	enclosed	space.	(1994,	p.	100-101)	While	this	may	be	the	case,	I	argue	that	these	acoustic	signatures,	while	lacking	the	overt	expression	of	a	reverberant	concert	hall,	are	nonetheless	signatures	that	may	be	easily	identified	by	listeners.	As	such,	while	the	THX	demonstration	may	attempt	to	focus	our	attention	to	the	superior	performance	of	the	sound	system	by	shortening	reverberation	times	across	the	full	spectrum	of	sound	in	the	room,	that	is	not	to	say	the	audience	won’t	be	aware	of	the	space	of	audition.	In	fact,																																																									
67 THX certification is one such standard common in theatres worldwide, requiring specific acoustical and visual 
performance from theatres and the technologies they use. See http://www.thx.com/professional/cinema-
certification/thx-certified-cinemas/ (accessed 5 May 2014). Likewise, numerous theatres worldwide have adopted 
the theatre design specifications of Dolby Cinemas. Dolby Cinemas have announced (April 9, 2015) that AMC 
Prime Theatres will open more than 100 new theatres across North America with Dolby’s new specifications. See 













I've	never	used	the	process	in	the	58	films	I	made	before	and	I	have	no	plans	to	 do	 it	 ever	 again,	 but	 it	 was	 important	 to	 capture	 the	 intentions	 of	 the	painters.	Once	you	saw	the	crazy	niches	and	bulges	and	rock	pendants	in	the	walls,	 it	 was	 obvious	 it	 had	 to	 be	 in	 3D.	 (Herzog	 in	 Goldstein	 and	 Rainy,	2010)	For	Herzog,	3D	filming	was	essential	for	conveying	a	sense	of	spatial	depth,	but	in	general	terms,	he	views	3D	technology	as	largely	distracting:	
We	shouldn't	ever	have	a	romantic	comedy	in	3D,	because	we,	the	audience,	have	 an	 emotional	 approach	 to	 the	 storytelling	which	 leaves	open	 a	 lot	 of	narrative	possibilities…you	wonder	as	you	watch	–	will	the	young	man	and	the	woman	 find	 each	other?	Fall	 in	 love?	We	 start	 to	 fantasize,	which	you	
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could	 never	 do	 in	 3D,	 where	 you	 would	 be	 in	 the	 handcuffs	 of	 the	technological	 effects.	 With	 cinema,	 your	 fantasies	 should	 always	 be	 free.	(Herzog	in	Goldstein	and	Rainy,	2010)	Wim	Wenders,	a	director	often	associated	with	Herzog	through	their	mutual	association	with	the	Neuer	Deutscher	Film	movement,	offers	a	different	opinion	of	3D	film.		In	his	film	Every	Thing	Will	Be	Fine	(2015),	Wenders	promotes	the	power	of	3D	to	augment	the	film,	helping	to	“bring	out	the	emotions”	of	his	characters:	
I	 could	 see	 it	 created	 a	 whole	 different	 presence	 in	 close-up.	 It	 has	 a	magnifying	effect,	 it’s	 like	a	magnifying	glass,	making	everything	stand	out.	(Wenders	in	Connolly,	2015)	Though	Wenders’	point	of	view	may	seem	to	refute	Herzog’s,	from	a	poietic	perspective	Wenders’	use	of	3D	in	Every	Thing	Will	Be	Fine,	is	much	like	that	of	Herzog’s	in	Cave	of	Forgotten	Dreams,	insofar	as	3D	is	used	to	reveal	the	contours	of	the	subject	matter	in	order	to	draw	closer	attention	to	their	respective	properties.	In	Herzog’s	case,	3D	is	used	to	connect	the	audience	to	the	motivations	of	the	artist(s)	by	revealing	the	contours	of	the	cave	walls,	while	Wenders	uses	3D	to	connect	the	audience	to	the	motivations	of	his	characters	through	magnification	of	their	faces.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	early	reviews	of	
Every	Thing	Will	Be	Fine	suggest	that	the	use	of	3D	may	not	have	achieved	the	kind	of	magnification	of	character	emotion	that	Wenders	sought,	with	one	reviewer	referring	to	some	of	the	performances,	perhaps	wryly,	as	‘shockingly	flat’.68	Film	critic	Nicholas	Barber	notes	that	unlike	his	earlier	film	Pina	(2011),	in	which	3D	was	used	to	enhance	the	spectacle	of	dance,	Wenders	‘does	so	little	with	the	3D	that	it	only	deepens	the	impression	that	Everything	Will	Be	Fine	is	a	missed	opportunity.69	While	the	criticism	of	3D	in	Every	Thing	Will	Be	Fine	focuses	around	what	it	does	not	achieve,	it	is	plausible	that,	as	Herzog	might	have	it,	the	use	of	3D	distracts	audiences,	perhaps	unconsciously	in	this	instance,	from	connecting	with	the	characters	in	the	way	Wenders	imagines.		
																																																								
68 'Every Thing Will Be Fine' is a Major Disappointment sourced at http://www.indiewire.com/article/berlin-
review-wim-wenders-every-thing-will-be-fine-is-a-major-disappointment-20150210 accessed 8 April 2015  	








In	visual	perception,	the	shape	of	focal	attention	found	its	locus	in	a	central	core	within	 the	 visual	 field…the	 gravitational	 shape	 of	 this	 visual	 focus	 is	weighed	 in	 the	 center	of	 this	visual	 field	as	a	phenomenological	 structure.	(Ihde,	2007,	p.	91)		Ihde’s	comment	is	underpinned	by	the	idea	that	the	attentional	focus	of	visual	perception	involves	a	spatial	center.	Unlike	aural	attention,	which	involves	a	shifting	temporal	focus,	visual	attention	involves	a	spatial	focus,	presumably	also	at	the	‘leading	edge’	of	the	temporal	span	(as	his	example	of	the	baseball,	above,	suggested).	In	other	words,	though	moving	images	may	make	us	aware	of	the	succession	of	time,	we	are	not	able	to	focus	across	the	temporal	span	in	the	same	way	afforded	in	aural	perception.	Further	to	this,	I	maintain	that	with	a	relaxed	or	‘broad’	temporal	focus,	aural	perception	may	be	allowed	to	reach	back	beyond	the	horizon	of	Husserl’s	retentions,	into	memories	of	past	experiences.	We	might	recall	Voegelin’s	experience	of	generating	‘morning-park-ness’	in	2008	at	Waterlow	Park	in	London.	While	listening	broadly	to	the	sounds	of	the	park	at	dawn,	she	is	able	to	reach	back	to	her	experiences	of	parks,	which	in	turn	shape	her	perception	of	it.71	In	this	process,	Voegelin	is	aware	of	the	current	temporal	span,	and	the	sounds	operating	within	it.	Without	paying	particular	attention	to	any	one	point	along	this	span,	she	is	able	to	turn	her	focus	to	past	memories.	In	this	way,	Voegelin	exhibits	a	dual	focus:	she	is	aware	of	the	past	in	the	present.	This	particular	condition	of	listening	provides	the	phonograph	with	a	unique	characteristic,	allowing	for	a	very	particular	kind	of	engagement,	one	in	which	a	listener	is	able	to	attend	to	both	the	phonograph	in	audition	and	memories	associated	with	it.	In	contrast,	a	duality	of	focus	comes	far	less	readily	in	visual	perception.		
																																																								
71 Augoyard and Torgue (2005) refer to the phenomenon of sounds evoking memories of the past as anamnesis 
(21). Additionally, they refer to a sound imagined, but not actually heard as phonomnesis (85). In the instance of 
Voegelin recalling her ‘morning-park-ness’ the sounds of Waterlow Park produce an anamnesis of her past 




Do	I	add	to	the	images	of	movies?	I	don’t	think	so;	I	don’t	have	time:	in	front	of	the	screen,	I	am	not	free	to	shut	my	eyes;	otherwise,	opening	them	again,	I	 would	 not	 discover	 the	 same	 image;	 I	 am	 constrained	 to	 a	 continuous	voracity;	a	host	of	other	qualities,	but	not	pensiveness;	whence	the	interest,	for	me,	of	the	photogram.	(1981,	p.	55)	Here	Barthes	levels	the	same	criticism	at	2D	film	as	Herzog	does	at	3D	film,	though	for	Herzog	his	inability	to	adequately	engage	with	the	materials	is	born	from	a	perceived	invasion	of	space,	whereas	Barthes’	experience	is	confounded	by	the	fact	that	the	images	are	moving,	an	invasion	of	his	time.	That	the	images	are	moving	means,	for	Barthes,	that	real-time	interpretation	of	film	is	not	possible,	as	he	simply	does	not	‘have	time’.	As	the	above	quote	suggests,	Barthes	understands	moving	images	to	lack	the	ability	to	allow	for	a	personal	adventure	to	occur.	As	I	will	explore	in	chapter	six,	Barthes	believes	that	the	still	image	encourages	a	hermeneutic	response,	one	in	which	a	kind	of	personal	adventure	may	take	place.	Further	to	Barthes’	assessment	of	the	moving	image	as	demanding	‘continuous	voracity,’	he	notes	that	film	shares	the	same	temporal	progression	as	our	standard	perception	of	time:	
Like	the	real	world,	the	filmic	world	is	sustained	by	the	presumption	that,	as	Husserl	says,	“the	experience	will	constantly	continue	to	flow	by	in	the	same	constitutive	style”;	but	 the	photograph	breaks	 the	“constitutive	style”	 (this	is	its	astonishment);	it	is	without	future	(this	is	its	pathos,	its	melancholy);	in	it,	 no	 protensity,	 whereas	 the	 cinema	 is	 protensive,	 hence	 in	 no	 way	melancholic	 (what	 is	 it,	 then?	 –	 It	 is,	 then,	 simply	 “normal”,	 like	 life).	Motionless,	 the	 Photograph	 flows	 back	 from	 presentation	 to	 retention.	(1981,	p.	89-90)	Barthes’	assessment	suggests	that	the	‘constitutive	style’	of	film,	that	is,	its	likeness	to	real-time,	is	what	makes	it	protensive.	Such	temporality	impedes	Barthes’	interpretation,	rendering	film	inferior	to	his	engagement	with	the	photograph,	a	medium	in	which	he	is	able	to	detect	pathos.	It	should	be	noted	here	that	Barthes’	film	presumably	involves	the	marriage	of	sound	and	vision,	and	in	some	respects	his	comparison	of	film	and	the	photograph	encounters	the	very	stumbling	block	I	have	been	at	pains	to	avoid	–	the	comparison	of	a	mono-
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modal	format	with	a	multi-modal	format.	It	is	unclear	as	to	how	Barthes	may	have	felt	about	silent	film	or	indeed	the	phonograph,	but	we	might	be	safe	to	assume	that	he	would	have	detected	the	same	‘constitutive	style’	in	both	formats,	and	on	this	basis,	labeled	them	both	protensive.	The	word	‘protensive’,	as	employed	by	Barthes,	is	used	to	describe	the	reaching	of	the	one	point	in	time	to	another,	in	the	case	of	film,	from	the	past	to	the	present.	As	mentioned,	we	might	conclude	that	Barthes’	may	have	considered	the	phonograph	to	convey	the	same	protensity	as	the	moving	image,	insofar	as	the	constitutive	style	of	a	past	reality	is	replayed	in	the	present.	Likewise	Chion	might	argue	that	the	protensity	of	the	phonograph	is	even	greater,	given	its	power	to	define	the	present	and	the	successive	passing	of	time,	the	role	it	plays	in	the	audiovisual	contract.	However,	the	protensity	of	the	phonograph	requires	further	analysis.	To	begin,	Barthes	detects	melancholy	in	all	photographs;	that	is	to	say,	this	melancholy	is	ontological,	born	of	the	medium	itself.	This	can	be	detected	in	the	viewer’s	movement	between	the	present	to	the	moment	of	capture.	Barthes	conceives	of	this	movement	as	a	spectator’s	attentional	focus	to	‘the	pose’:	
What	founds	the	nature	of	Photography	is	the	pose.	The	physical	duration	of	this	 pose	 is	 of	 little	 consequence;	 even	 in	 the	 interval	 of	 a	 millionth	 of	 a	second	(Edgerton’s	drop	of	milk)	there	has	still	been	a	pose,	for	the	pose	is	not,	here,	the	attitude	of	the	target,	or	even	a	technique	of	the	Operator,	but	the	 term	of	an	“intention”	of	 reading:	 looking	at	a	photograph,	 I	 inevitably	include	in	my	scrutiny	the	thought	of	that	instant,	however	brief,	in	which	a	real	 thing	 happened	 to	 be	 motionless	 in	 front	 of	 the	 eye.	 I	 project	 the	present	 photograph’s	 immobility	 upon	 the	 past	 shot,	 and	 it	 is	 this	 arrest	which	constitutes	the	pose.	(1981,	p.	78)		Barthes	continues,	suggesting	that	it	is	‘the	pose’	that	defines	the	photograph,	separating	it	from	the	related	practice	of	film:	
This	 explains	 why	 the	 Photograph’s	 noeme	 deteriorates	 when	 this	photograph	is	animated	and	becomes	cinema:	in	the	Photograph,	something	















Camera	Lucida,	is	divided	into	two	parts.	Part	One	constitutes	Barthes	appraisal	of	his	own	engagement	with	the	photograph,	exploring	its	affective	qualities.	In	Part	Two,	Barthes	finds	a	picture	of	his	mother,	who	had	recently	passed	away,	and	declares	it	the	photograph	that	conveys	her	air	where	all	other	photographs	fail.	This	photograph	becomes	the	central	focus	of	this	second	section	of	the	book,	which	constitutes	a	pursuit	of	the	photograph’s	universal	(ontological)	qualities.	Both	sections	provide	excellent	points	of	comparison	with	the	phonograph,	and	it	is	to	Part	One	that	I	will	first	turn.		Of	Part	One,	Jacques	Rancière	notes:		 Barthes’s	manoeuver	was	 to	break	 the	 representation	of	 the	 indifferent	 in	two.	 The	 indifferent	 is,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 that	which	 is	 identifiable	 by	 the	intersection	 of	 a	 certain	 number	 of	 general	 traits.	 On	 the	 other,	 it	 is	 the	absolute	singularity	of	that	which	imposes	its	brute	presence,	and	affects	by	this	brute	presence.	We	recognize	here	the	opposition	between	the	studium,	conceived	as	 the	 informative	 content	of	 the	photograph,	 and	 the	punctum,	conceived	 as	 its	 affective	 force,	 irreducible	 to	 transmission	 of	 knowledge.	(2013,	p.	87)		Barthes	investigates	the	studium	and	punctum	in	some	detail.	He	suggests	that	the	term	studium	‘doesn’t	mean,	at	least	not	immediately,	“study”,	but	application	to	a	thing,	taste	for	someone,	a	kind	of	general,	enthusiastic	commitment,	of	course	but	without	special	acuity’	(1981,	p.	26).	Of	his	experience	of	the	punctum,	Barthes	suggests	that	it	‘will	break	(or	punctuate)	the	studium.	This	time	it	is	not	I	who	seek	it	out	(as	I	invest	the	field	of	the	
studium	with	my	sovereign	consciousness),	it	is	this	element	which	rises	from	the	scene,	shoots	out	of	it	like	an	arrow,	and	pierces	me’	(p.	26).	Such	an	appraisal	may	at	first	appear	rather	simplistic;	Barthes’	distinction	seems	to	
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make	an	argument	for	a	differentiation	between	the	‘general	traits’	of	a	photograph	and	its	affective	properties,	which	it	does	to	a	certain	extent.	However,	the	implications	of	such	a	manoeuver	reach	much	further	than	a	simple	intellectual/emotional,	head/heart	description	of	engagement.	Rancière	again:		 In	a	certain	manner,	Barthes	contorts	the	formalist	modernist,	who	opposed	the	 form	 (artistic/pictorial)	 to	 the	 anecdote	 (empiricist/photographic).	Barthes	diverts	the	opposition	by	transferring	the	anecdote	to	the	studium,	in	 order	 to	 pit	 it	 against	 not	 the	 artistic	 form,	 but	 an	 experience	 of	 the	unique	 that	 refutes	 the	 pretension	 to	 art	 as	 well	 as	 the	 platitude	 of	information.	(2013,	p.	87)				This	reassessment	of	the	‘formalist	modernist’	approach,	in	which	the	form	and	anecdote	are	grouped	and	juxtaposed	with	the	unique	experience	of	the	individual	viewing	the	photograph	is	of	considerable	significance	when	evaluating	the	phonograph,	especially	where	environmental	sound	composition	is	concerned,	insofar	as	the	tension	between	form	and	anecdote	is,	as	I	have	argued,	a	significant	point	of	contention	between	environmental	works	and	the	broader	genre	of	acousmatic	music.	As	I	will	explore,	if	we	are	to	uphold	the	notion	that	the	form	and	anecdote	of	the	phonograph	belong	to	the	same	order	(the	studium),	the	tension	surrounding	the	use	of	mimetic	materials	in	electroacoustic	composition	is	subverted.	The	focus	moves	from	the	materiality	of	the	phonograph	and	the	poietic	process	of	the	composer	to	the	affective	qualities	of	the	work:	qualities	that	are	solely	governed	by	the	esthetic	process	of	the	listener.	It	is	my	strong	belief	that	there	is	much	more	to	be	learned	about	the	phonograph’s	ontology	from	a	hermeneutic	perspective	when	composer-driven	poiesis	is	removed	from	consideration.	This	opinion	finds	support	in	Barthes’	early	assessment	of	engagement	with	the	photograph	in	Camera	
Lucida.		There	are	two	important	observations	made	by	Barthes	in	the	early	stages	of	his	discussion,	before	his	description	of	the	studium	and	punctum	begins.	The	first	observation	is	the	notion	of	adventure	whereby	Barthes’	engagement	with	a	
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photograph	is	contingent	upon	being	animated	by	it	(1981,	p.19).72	The	second	is	the	notion	of	the	Operator	(the	photographer)	and	the	Spectator	(the	person	attending	to	the	resultant	photograph)	and	how	their	perspectives	differ.	These	two	observations	help	to	understand	the	terms	within	which	Barthes’	assessment	operates.	It	also	allows	us	to	consider	how	his	appraisal	of	the	photograph	might	be	further	expanded.		Barthes	notes	that	the	world	is	flooded	with	photographs,	and	that	he	simply	does	not	attend	to	all	of	them.	We	might	say	that	world	is	also	flooded	with	phonographs,	as	I’m	sure	those	who	promote	Schafer’s	‘schizophonia’	would	agree,	and	that	we	too,	in	our	selective	listening	practices,	cannot	attend	to	every	recording	we	encounter.	Barthes	relegates	the	majority	of	photographs	to	that	of	objects	without	affect.	For	Barthes,	these	photographs	do	not	exist,	for	they	do	not	produce	an	internal	advenience	(adventure,	animation),	understood	as	the	primary	condition	by	which	any	kind	of	engagement	with	the	photograph	can	commence:			 The	 principle	 of	 adventure	 allows	 me	 to	 make	 Photography	 exist.	Conversely,	without	adventure,	no	photograph.	(1981,	p.	19)		Barthes	here	exhibits	what	I	take	to	be	a	phenomenological	perspective,	and	it	is	in	the	notion	of	the	picture	that	advenes	that	we	discover	the	importance	of	Barthes’	intentionality	in	the	assessment	of	the	phonograph’s	ontology.	Barthes’	‘adventure’	is	not	chiefly	a	result	of	his	cognitive	interpretation	of	a	still	image,	rather	it	is	a	product	of	his	primary	engagement	with	a	photograph,	one	that	catches	him	unaware:					 In	this	glum	desert,	suddenly	a	specific	photograph	reaches	me;	it	animates	me	and	I	animate	it.	So	this	is	how	I	must	name	the	attraction	which	makes	it	exist:	an	animation.	The	photograph	itself	is	in	no	way	animated	(I	do	not	believe	 in	 “lifelike”	 photographs),	 but	 it	 animates	me:	 this	 is	what	 creates	every	adventure.	(1981,	p.	20)																																																										72	Barthes	uses	the	terms	animation,	adventure	and	advenience	interchangeably	throughout	his	discussion.	
	 	 209	
In	phenomenological	terms,	Barthes	insistence	that	a	photograph	only	exists	if	it	advenes,	echoes	Husserl’s	phenomenological	concept	of	the	intentional	object	(noema)	as	a	product	of	noesis	(intentionality).	It	also	resounds	within	the	context	of	reader-response	theory,	which	Barthes	contributed	significantly	to,	a	theory	in	which	the	audience	or	reader	constructs	meaning	from	the	work,	not	the	writer	(Barthes,	1967).	We	might	also	recall	Nattiez’	semiology,	particularly	regarding	Pirandello’s	observation	that	the	reader	“fills	up”	words	with	the	meaning	they	have	for	them,	as	previously	quoted	in	chapter	four.	As	such,	Barthes’	insistence	that	a	photograph’s	existence	is	contingent	upon	his	intentionality	finds	support	in	a	number	of	different	theoretical	fields.			It	is	from	this	position,	one	in	which	adventure	is	aroused,	that	we	may	begin	to	detect	the	affective	features	of	the	phonograph,	including	the	studium	and	
punctum.	Barthes’	initial	observation	is	used	to	define	the	three	kinds	of	photographs	we	encounter:	those	without	adventure,	those	with	adventure	and,	necessarily,	a	discernable	studium,	and	finally	those	with	adventure,	a	studium,	and	a	punctum.	The	most	important	revelation	of	Barthes’	advening	picture	is	this:	access	to	the	ontological	features	of	the	photograph	is	only	granted	through	the	intentionality	of	the	one	who	attends	to	it;	that	is,	the	photographer	does	not	hold	the	key	to	the	photograph’s	ontology,	the	intentionality	of	the	Spectator	does.			In	an	earlier	essay	entitled	The	Death	of	the	Author	(1967),	Barthes	promotes	a	reader-response	theory	that	sets	the	foundation	for	this	argument.	Of	traditional	models	of	interpretation,	he	notes:		 The	explanation	of	the	work	is	always	sought	in	the	man	who	has	produced	it,	 as	 if,	 through	 the	 more	 or	 less	 transparent	 allegory	 of	 fiction,	 it	 was	always	 finally	 the	 voice	 of	 one	 and	 the	 same	 person,	 the	 author,	 which	delivered	his	“confidence.”	(1967,	p.	2)			Barthes	dismisses	this	appraisal	of	the	work	and	the	presence	of	the	author	within	it,	stating	that	‘language	knows	a	subject,	not	a	person’	(p.	3),	and	that	the	notion	of	interpreting	the	author’s	intentions	in	text	is	redundant:			
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	 Once	 the	 Author	 is	 gone,	 the	 claim	 to	 “decipher”	 a	 text	 becomes	 quite	useless.	To	give	an	Author	to	a	text	is	to	impose	upon	that	text	a	stop	clause,	to	 furnish	 it	with	a	 final	signification,	 to	close	 the	writing.	This	conception	perfectly	suits	criticism,	which	can	then	take	as	its	major	task	the	discovery	of	 the	 Author	 (or	 his	 hypostases:	 society,	 history,	 the	 psyche,	 freedom)	beneath	the	work:	once	the	Author	is	discovered,	the	text	is	“explained”.	(p.	5)		Barthes’	appraisal	of	the	author	promotes	a	semiology	of	written	language	in	which	the	author’s	poietic	processes	can	be	largely	disregarded:	for	Barthes,	the	author	is	‘dead’.	I	will	discuss	the	role	of	semiology	in	Barthes	perspective	in	greater	detail	shortly	with	regard	to	the	role	of	the	operator	and	spectator,	but	for	now	I	will	note	that	in	Camera	Lucida,	Barthes’	analysis	of	the	photograph	also	mutes	the	poietic	processes	of	the	photographer,	proclaiming	instead	that	the	esthetic	processes	of	the	spectator	are	the	most	relevant	in	the	activity	of	interpretation.	He	states:	“certain	details	may	“prick”	me.	If	they	do	not,	it	is	doubtless	because	the	photographer	has	put	them	there	intentionally”	(1981,	p.	47).	Though	Barthes’	comment	comes	across	as	a	thinly	veiled	ridicule	of	operator	intentionality,	he	does	not	go	as	far	as	to	say	he	can	detect	what	such	intentionality	might	be;	to	do	so	would	be	to	hold	that	poietic	processes	do	in	fact	feature	in	esthetic	interpretation.	What	is	revealed	here	is	that	Barthes	believes	a	photographer’s	intentionality	does	not	hold	the	power	to	inflict	a	punctum.	Such	a	power	is	born	solely	of	a	spectator’s	personal	response.				Regarding	Barthes’	second	observation,	in	the	opening	pages	of	Camera	Lucida,	he	notes	‘that	the	photograph	can	be	the	object	of	three	practices	(or	of	three	emotions,	or	of	three	intentions):	to	do,	to	undergo,	to	look’	(1981,	p.9).	Of	these	three	practices	he	describes	the	participants	as	the	Operator	(the	photographer)	the	Spectrum	(that	which	is	photographed)	and	the	Spectator	(the	viewer	of	the	rendered	photograph).	Barthes	notes	that	the	operator’s	photograph	is	fundamentally	different	to	that	of	the	spectator,	as	the	operator	is	concerned	with	the	‘formation	of	the	image	through	an	optical	device’,	while	the	spectator’s	experience	is	‘descended	essentially,	so	to	speak,	from	the	chemical	revelation	of	
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	Returning	now	to	the	varieties	of	punctum	described	by	Barthes,	I	would	like	to	address	the	notion	of	death	in	the	phonograph	as	alluded	to	previously	in	this	chapter.	Recalling	Barthes’	analysis	of	protensity,	he	holds	that	photography	presents	a	melancholy	that	is	not	observed	in	other	forms	of	mediatised	reality.	In	his	view,	the	photograph	is	not	protensive,	in	that	the	moment	of	capture	does	reach	forward	to	the	spectator	as	cinema	does.	Rather,	the	spectator	is	drawn	to	the	past,	to	‘the	pose’.	Here	Barthes	articulates	his	conception	of	the	photograph’s	essence	(its	noeme)	with	clarity,	distinguishing	it	from	film,	and	indeed	phonography,	as	a	matter	of	temporal	incongruence.	Barthes’	promotion	of	the	pose	in	the	Photograph	leads	to	the	detection	of	death:		 By	 giving	 me	 the	 absolute	 past	 of	 the	 pose	 (aorist),	 the	 photograph	 tells	 me	death	in	the	future.	What	pricks	me	is	the	discovery	of	this	equivalence.	In	front	of	 the	 photograph	 of	my	mother	 as	 a	 child,	 I	 tell	myself:	 she	 is	 going	 to	 die:	 I	shudder,	like	Winnicott’s	psychotic	patient,	over	a	catastrophe	which	has	already	








73 It is important to note that this is not an isolated punctum for me. I have recently encountered a similar 
experience upon calling the household of a man who had recently passed away, his voice still emanating from the 
answering machine down the telephone line. I experience this punctum too when listening to New Zealand 
composer Jack Body’s piece The Street Where I Live (2007). Having passed away earlier this year, his voice 















Punctum	as	blind	field		Barthes’	suggestion	that	a	punctum	is	born	of	esthetic	analysis,	yet	something	embedded	at	the	trace	level;	that	is,	something	‘already	there’,	is	significant.	It	ties	spectator	engagement	to	the	‘brute	presence’	(Rancière,	2013,	p.	87)	of	the	referent,	a	point	I	alluded	to	in	chapter	five.	Barthes	expands	this	argument,	introducing	the	concept	of	the	blind	field:		 The	cinema	has	a	power	which	at	first	glance	the	Photograph	does	not	have:	the	screen	(as	Bazin	has	remarked)	is	not	a	frame	but	a	hideout;	the	man	or	woman	 who	 emerges	 from	 it	 continues	 living:	 a	 “blind	 field”	 constantly	doubles	our	partial	vision.	(1981,	p.	55-56)		At	first	glance,	we	might	conclude	that	the	‘blind	field’	of	cinema,	and	indeed	the	‘deaf	field’	of	the	phonograph,	is	a	condition	born	of	temporal	progression	in	mediatised	events,	and	that	photography	would	fail	to	produce	a	blind	field	on	the	basis	that	the	photograph	is	without	temporal	progression.	However,	Barthes	suggests	that	a	blind	field	is	born	when	a	punctum	is	detected.	He	detects	such	a	field	in	James	Van	der	Zee’s	“Family	Portrait”	(1926):		 When	we	define	the	Photograph	as	a	motionless	image,	this	does	not	mean	only	 that	 the	 figures	 it	 represents	do	not	move;	 it	means	 that	 they	do	not	
emerge,	 do	 not	 leave:	 they	 are	 anesthetized	 and	 fastened	 down,	 like	butterflies.	Yet	once	there	is	a	punctum,	a	blind	field	is	created	(is	divined):	on	account	of	her	necklace,	the	black	woman	in	her	Sunday	best	has	had,	for	me,	a	whole	life	external	to	her	portrait.	(1981,	p.	57)		I	do	not	doubt	that	such	a	condition	exists.	Though	we	are	ceaselessly	drawn	to	the	pose	of	the	photograph,	where	a	punctum	is	detected	our	imagination	takes	over	to	some	degree.	However,	as	Barthes	suggests,	our	imagination	is	still	tied	to	the	photograph	itself.	However	fanciful	we	imagine	this	blind	field	to	be,	it	is	not	an	alien	field;	that	is,	our	imagination	is	always	tied	to	‘what	nonetheless	is	already	there’	(1981,	p.	55),	the	brute	presence	of	the	referent	always	returns	our	imagination	to	the	‘that	has	been’	of	the	photograph.	This	is	where	the	photograph	and	phonograph	differ.	Though	when	listening	to	a	phonograph,	an	
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individual	may	‘divine’	a	second	field	related	to	the	source	materials,	they	can	also	divine	other	experiences	that	find	no	foundation	in	the	materials	themselves.	This	is	perhaps	its	most	extraordinary	feature;	a	feature	that	I	will	now	turn	to.		
Punctum	as	memory			Barry	Truax’	Riverrun	(1986)	produces	a	punctum	for	me,	though	this	is	largely	because	I	do	not	detect	his	ecological	concerns	in	this	work.	This	punctum	is	of	a	very	common	variety	in	phonography,	yet	entirely	absent	from	photography:	the	punctum	that	recalls	a	certain	person,	time,	or	event	in	our	lives.	Importantly,	this	person,	time	or	event	is	not	captured	in	the	phonograph	itself,	rather	the	phonograph	compels	us	to	engage	with	our	memories	of	that	person	or	event.	In	short,	where	this	punctum	is	concerned,	the	sounds	embedded	in	the	phonograph	reference	a	specific	past	reality	(whatever	that	may	be),	yet	we	are	engaged	with	another.	In	Riverrun	I	am	transported	to	the	9th	floor	of	the	Victoria	University	Library	some	17	years	ago,	where	I	analysed	this	piece	for	a	200-level	electroacoustic	composition	paper.	I	sat	there,	with	a	classmate,	and	we	discussed	this	work	having	listened	to	it	together.	Upon	hearing	this	work	today,	I	immediately	consider	my	classmate,	a	close	friend	at	the	time,	though	someone	I	have	not	seen	nor	thought	about	much	since	that	time.			This	experience	appears	to	be	widely	appreciated.	Hans	Baumgartner’s	“Remembrance	of	Things	Past:	Autobiographical	Memory	and	Emotion”	(1992),	presents	his	research	into	such	a	phenomenon.	Baumgartner	asked	73	students	if	they	could	think	of	a	piece	of	music	that	reminded	them	vividly	of	a	person	or	past	event.	Only	3	students	(2.19%)	identified	that	they	could	not:		 The	results	of	 this	study	suggest	 that	 the	subjects	who	participated	 in	 this	research	had	experienced	a	situation	in	which	a	piece	of	music	had	become	associated	with	an	event	from	their	lives	so	that	hearing	the	piece	of	music	evoked	 memories	 of	 the	 original	 episode.	 Most	 of	 the	 instances	 of	 this	phenomenon	 reported	 by	 undergraduate	 marketing	 majors	 involved	relationships	 with	 past	 or	 present	 lovers	 or	 experiences	 with	 family	 and	
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identify	any	of	the	birds	I	hear	–	and	it	is	this	foreignness	that	provides	a	punctum.	Having	recorded	many	dawn	choruses	myself,	I	am	drawn,	in	a	process	of	anamnesis,	to	prior	experiences	of	recording	such	environments;	the	mixed	feelings	of	being	away	from	home,	the	feeling	of	privilege	at	being	up	so	early	to	experience	something	that	others	are	not,	the	excitement	of	recording	something	new	and	the	feeling	of	potential	that	such	recordings	offer.	Though	my	particular	anamnesis	is	one	related	to	field	recording,	others	may	experience	a	less	technologically-focused	variety.	I	think	it	likely	that	anyone	who	has	experienced	a	dawn	chorus	in	a	foreign	country	will	engage	with	their	own	experiences	of	such	moments.	Cusack,	and	people	familiar	with	the	Ukrainian	wildlife,	may	have	a	more	specific	anamnetic	experience	when	listening	to	Dawn	Chorus,	Chernobyl	Town.			We	may	even	consider	acoustic	ecology	to	be	greatly	informed	by	the	phenomenon	of	environmental	anamnesis,	whereby	listeners	are	conceived	as	connected	to	past	events	or	people,	or	concepts	such	as	community,	family	or	civic	duty	through	sonic	triggers.	In	other	words,	the	power	of	environmental	sound	to	reference	the	non-auditory	is	the	basis	upon	which	the	arguments	of	acoustic	ecology	are	mounted,	though	as	I	have	asserted	in	chapter	four,	acoustic	ecologists	take	this	relationship	a	step	further,	tacitly	presuming	to	know	the	kind	of	experiences	these	acoustic	triggers	will	produce	in	listeners.			Augoyard	and	Torgue	appear	to	support	an	inter-subjective	reading	of	anamnesis:		 Although	 it	 is	 essentially	 subjective,	 anamnesis	 also	 has	 an	 archetypal	dimension.	 Specific	 sounds	 can	 produce	 common	 references	 for	 a	 given	culture:	 sounds	 of	 flowing	water,	 rain,	 crackling	 fire,	 thunder,	 and	 singing	birds,	 but	 also	 sounds	 of	 industrial	 automatic	 devices,	 cars,	 and	 urban	drones.	 There	 are	 many	 shared	 backgrounds	 over	 which	 individual	perceptions	are	 laid.	Archetypal	anamneses	are	 less	conscious	than	others,	but	they	can	be	just	as	effective.	(2006,	p.	23)		
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I	refute	the	notion	of	inter-subjective	anamnetic	experience.	While	it	is	conceivable	that	individuals	may	encounter	similar	types	of	memories	due	to	shared	cultural	norms	and	histories	(as	Augoyard	and	Torgue	suggest),	the	authors	effectively	disregard	the	specificity	of	an	individual’s	memories	and	their	unique	intentional	perspective	in	the	anamnetic	experience.	From	a	phenomenological	perspective,	the	supposed	‘archetypal	dimension’	of	anamnesis	does	not	hold	much	value.	Furthermore,	I	do	not	believe	that	one	person	can	access	another’s	anamnetic	experience,	which	I	believe	to	be	the	fundamental	misstep	of	soundscape	theory.			Though	I	am	convinced	of	the	power	of	environmental	sound	to	create	anamnesis	in	listeners,	I	am	yet	to	encounter	a	sound	in	situ	that	draws	me	to	a	specific	time,	place	or	person	with	the	accuracy	of	recorded	sound.	This	may	be	due	in	part	to	the	fact	that	situated	sound	can	never	be	repeated	with	the	same	level	of	accuracy	as	recorded	sound,	but	I	also	believe	that	the	multi-modality	of	situated	experience	confounds	our	ability	to	attend	to	the	specific	in	the	same	way	mono-modal	experience	does,	as	our	attentional	focus	is	distributed	between	our	other	senses.	We	might	recall	Ingold’s	assertion	that:		The	 environment	 that	 we	 experience,	 know	 and	 move	 around	 in	 is	 not	sliced	up	along	the	lines	of	the	sensory	pathways	by	which	we	enter	into	it…	in	 ordinary	 perceptual	 practice	 these	 registers	 cooperate	 so	 closely,	 and	with	 such	 overlap	 of	 function,	 that	 their	 respective	 contributions	 are	impossible	to	tease	apart.	(Ingold,	2007,	p.	10)		Where	environmental	sound	composition	is	concerned,	it	might	be	argued	that	the	primary	form	of	anamnesis	encountered	is	closer	to	that	of	situated	anamnesis,	certainly	upon	first	listen.	By	way	of	example,	if	I	were	to	hear	the	Eastbourne	fire	station’s	1pm	siren	(a	soundmark	of	my	home	village,	every	Saturday,	for	as	long	as	I	can	remember),	in	an	environmental	sound	composition,	I	would	no	doubt	encounter	the	less	specific	form	of	anamnesis	I	associate	with	the	situated	experience.	However,	on	repeated	listens	to	the	specific	composition,	further,	more	specific	anamnesis	may	arise,	those	related	to	the	phonograph	and	perhaps	events,	people	or	circumstances	related	to	my	
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current	context,	rather	than	the	anamnesis	produced	by	hearing	the	siren	itself.	In	this	way,	anamnesis	in	environmental	sound	composition	has	an	ability	to	become	multifaceted	with	some	ease.	Truax’	Riverrun	provides	an	excellent	example	of	this.	When	I	first	heard	Riverrun,	the	sounds	of	running	water	may	have	provoked	anamnesis	(I	do	not	recall	this	happening,	though	it	is	entirely	possible).	These	days,	my	anamnesis	is	related	specifically	to	my	classmate.	The	question	of	whether	one	can	experience	multiple	anamnesis	in	a	single	instance	is	worth	further	research,	but	for	now	I	will	note	that,	at	the	very	least,	this	
punctum	has	the	power	to	change,	and	that,	where	environmental	sound	composition	is	concerned,	the	movement	from	anamnesis	associated	with	situated	listening	to	a	phonograph-specific	anamnesis	appears	to	be	an	easy	one	to	make.	It	could	also	be	argued	that	the	ability	for	environmental	sound	composition	to	encourage	anamnesis	akin	to	that	of	situated	listening	is	indeed	its	tacitly	acknowledged	primary	power:	environmental	sound	has	a	pronounced	capacity	to	engage	listeners	with	memory	on	first	listen.		The	very	notion	of	anamnesis	expands	the	notion	of	temporality	in	the	phonograph	from	one	conceived	as	a	duality	between	the	past	reality	of	the	event	and	the	present	reality	of	audition,	and	provides	a	third	dimension,	measured	at	the	distance	between	the	present	audition	and	the	moment	our	memory	is	involuntarily	taken	to.	In	this	way,	where	anamnesis	is	at	play,	we	can	talk	about	the	present	reality	of	audition,	the	past	reality	of	the	content,	and	the	very	personal	reality	of	our	memories.	Such	a	punctum	is	not	a	feature	of	photography.	As	Barthes	has	it,	‘the	Photograph	is	violent:	not	because	it	shows	violent	things,	but	because	on	each	occasion	it	fills	the	sight	by	force,	and	because	in	it	nothing	can	be	refused	or	transformed’	(1980,	p.	91).	The	continued	pervasiveness	of	the	spectrum,	its	‘brute	presence’	as	Rancière	has	it,	is	identified	by	Barthes	as	the	Photograph’s	noeme.	It	is	this	very	feature	that	precludes	a	kind	of	photographic	anamnesis:		 Not	 only	 is	 the	 Photograph	 never,	 in	 essence,	 a	 memory…	 but	 it	 actually	blocks	memory,	quickly	becoming	counter	memory.	One	day,	some	friends	were	talking	about	their	childhood	memories;	 they	had	any	number;	but	 I,	
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	Before	detailing	the	compositions	of	this	portfolio,	I	think	it	is	important	to	place	them	within	the	broader	context	of	environmental	sound	art.	As	noted	in	Volume	I	my	pieces	are	primarily	concerned	with	the	phonograph,	and	it	is	the	interaction	of	the	environment	with	acousmatic	art	that	constitutes	the	frame	within	which	these	works	were	created.	It	should	be	noted	that	there	is	a	long	history	of	phonograph-specific	environmental	sound	works	in	Australasia,	and	it	is	in	this	context	that	my	works	also	reside.	New	Zealanders	Douglas	Lilburn,	Jack	Body,	Susan	Frykberg,	John	Cousins,	Chris	Cree	Brown,	Annea	Lockwood	and	Reuben	Derrick,	along	with	Australians	Garth	Paine,	Andrew	Skeoch,	David	Lumsdaine,	Ros	Bandt	and	Leah	Barclay,	are	just	some	of	the	composers	who	have	worked	with	environmental	sound	and	the	phonograph.	I	myself	have	a	particular	affinity	with	the	work	of	Douglas	Lilburn,	as	his	work	involves	a	particular	intersection	of	technology	and	environmental	sound	that	I	find	compelling.	I	will	show	how	his	work	has	influenced	my	own	in	the	detailing	of	my	pieces	that	follows	shortly.		Jose	Iges	(2000),	in	his	paper	“Soundscapes:	A	Historical	Approach”,	writes:		 Three	very	different	tendencies	have	emerged	within	soundscape	in	general.	The	first…		was	represented	by	the	more	or	less	direct	adherents	of	Murray	Schafer.	The	second	involved	what	we	could	call	 freer	work	with	the	sound	environment,	 in	some	cases	incorporating	elements	of	poetry,	documentary	or	reportage,	and	in	others	creating	"sound	bridges"	between	two	natural	or	urban	 environments,	 relating	 them	 directly	 or	 with	 the	 help	 of	 telephone	lines	 or	 communications	 satellites…	 	 The	 third	 tendency	 has	 been	represented	 in	 recent	 years	 by	 the	work	 of	 sound	 artists	 like	 the	 Spaniard	Francisco	 López.	 In	 his	 case,	 the	 acoustic	 environment	 is	 considered	 to	 all	
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Title:	 	 	 BFMTPHNO-002	(2015)	
Duration:	 	 5’58”	
Format:	 	 B-format	phonograph	with	improvisation	on	site		

























































































































































































































































































Title:	 	 	 2CHPHNO-004	(2015)	
Duration:	 	 7’00”	
Format:	 	 Stereo	phonograph		
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